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Patent Inconsistency
SAURABH VISHNUBHAKAT*
Despite the promise of efficiency through the use of expert agency adjudication in
U.S. patent law, administrative substitution continues to fall short. In a variety of
ways, the decade-old system of Patent Office adjudication is simply an additional
place to litigate rather than the robust technocratic alternative it was meant to be.
These problems have arisen from important defects in the statutory design, but also
from the enormous expansion and ascendancy of the Patent Office itself. Moreover,
while duplicative litigation over patent validity is recognized and criticized, its scale
and scope has eluded detailed empirical analysis until now. This Article documents
and measures those ill effects and explains their structural origins. It evaluates
varying responses from Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions and from
regulatory experimentation in the Patent Office itself. The Article concludes with
proposals for reform. The analytical framework for reform that is suggested here is
especially timely given the incompleteness of judicial and regulatory responses thus
far.
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INTRODUCTION
The dramatic reform that upended patent law a decade ago has never fully come
to grips with a defect at the heart of its design. When the 2011 America Invents Act
(AIA) took effect amid bipartisan, bicameral consensus, its most far-reaching change
was a reallocation of power away from the federal courts and into the administrative
setting of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).1 The courts had
long been the target of criticism for intolerably high costs, delays, and inaccuracies
that surrounded patent litigation—especially disputes over whether the patents

1. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1667, 1669 (2019).
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involved were valid at all.2 Patent validity is a complex inquiry frequently requiring
not only familiarity with the doctrinal requirements of patentability but also the
science and engineering principles underlying the patented invention.3 Lay judges
and juries tend to be ill-equipped or at least require significant education in each case,
and so the AIA aimed to have USPTO administrative patent judges with both
“competent legal knowledge and scientific ability” evaluate patent validity.4
The defect came from two unappreciated difficulties in the task of errorcorrection. One is that valid (or likely-valid) patents are not distinguishable from
invalid (or likely-invalid) ones, at least not easily.5 Indeed, if they were, then the
enterprise of error-correction would itself be largely pointless.6 The other difficulty
follows from the first: without careful design, creating processes to invalidate “bad”
patents more easily will routinely make it easier to invalidate “good” patents as well.7
Yet this was the very mandate of the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB), whose expert administrative patent judges would more cheaply, more
quickly, and more accurately dispense with poor-quality patents that the USPTO’s
own patent examination process should never have allowed to be granted.8 The
PTAB was to be a highly preferable substitute for the federal courts.9 Defendants
who had been sued in U.S. district court for infringing a patent could efficiently
resolve the validity of those patents in the PTAB rather than in the court.10 Even those
who had not been sued for infringement could challenge a patent in the PTAB and
seek preemptive declaratory relief.11

2. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 50–64 (2016)
[hereinafter Strategic Decision Making] (identifying cost, delay, and accuracy as key
pathologies in patent litigation that Congress hoped to remedy through the America Invents
Act).
3. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899, 900–01
(2017) (explaining that compliance with patent validity requirements is assessed from the
perspective of the “person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to which the invention
pertains” (internal quotations omitted)).
4. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 52–53; 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
5. Emerging Trends in Patent Quality: Hearing No. 4 Session 1 on Competition and
Consumer Protection Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Oct. 24, 2018) (testimony of Saurabh
Vishnubhakat) [hereinafter FTC Testimony], www.bit.ly/2Ebku31 [https://perma.cc/A6DR2334].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 51–53; 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
9. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 49 (discussing this substitutionary
function as a “major normative argument for administrative ex post review”); see generally
Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy
Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237 (2012) (discussing court-agency substitution as a vehicle for
policy development, not only error-correction); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard
of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (same).
10. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 49 (discussing the standard model of
defensive petitioning).
11. Id. at 48 (discussing the nonstandard model of preemptive petitioning).
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This emphasis on the twin virtues of expertise and substitution brooked little
sympathy for the risk of collateral damage to valid patents, especially through
repeated legal attacks. One common refrain was that patent owners had no real cause
for concern if their patents were valid, for they would surely survive legal
challenge.12 Another, more systemic assurance was that substitution into the PTAB
would significantly conserve judicial resources. But to the contrary, the USPTO’s
expertise has not been a panacea for serial challenges against patent owners, and a
significant share of PTAB litigation has duplicated the work of other tribunals.
For example, during the 2010s, Eli Lilly asserted its U.S. Patent No. 7,772,209 in
U.S. district court against a number of alleged infringers.13 The validity of the Lilly
patent, directed to “antifolate combination therapies,” was later challenged in
multiple petitions for administrative review before the PTAB.14 The PTAB
ultimately upheld the patent, but by that time, the district court litigations had already
reached their own conclusions, also upholding the patent in each of five parallel
cases.
In an even more stark example, Trading Technologies in 2005 and again in 2010
had asserted its U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304 in U.S. district court against multiple
alleged infringers.15 During the same period, Trading Technologies had also itself
been sued in U.S. district court for declaratory judgments that its patent was invalid

12. E.g., Timothy B. Lee, Large Patent Holders Hate This Reform Proposal. That’s a
Good Sign., WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/09/24/large-patent-holders-hate-this-reform-proposal-thats-a-good-sign/
[https://perma.cc/7AA8-JUVC].
13. E.g., Complaint, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1037
(S.D. Ind. 2015) (No. 1:10-cv-01376); Complaint, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc.,
No. 1:12-cv-00086, 2017 WL 3478977 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 2012); Complaint, Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Sun Pharma Glob. FZE, No. 1:13-cv-01469 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2013); Complaint, Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Glenmark Generics Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00104, 2017 WL 3478976 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 23,
2014); Complaint, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nang Kuang Pharm. Co., Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-01647 (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 8, 2014).
14. Accord Healthcare, Inc., USA v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2013-00356 (P.T.A.B. June
14, 2013); Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-00237 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24,
2015); Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-00240 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24,
2015); Sandoz Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-00318 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2015);
Wockhardt Bio AG v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-01335 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2016);
Wockhardt Bio AG v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-01337 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2016); Apotex
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-01190 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2016); Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., No. IPR2016-01191 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2016); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., No. IPR2016-01340 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2016); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. IPR2016-01341 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2016); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No.
IPR2016-01343 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2016); Wockhardt Bio AG v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR201601393 (P.T.A.B. July 8, 2016); Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IPR2016-01429 (P.T.A.B.
July 14, 2016).
15. E.g., Complaint, Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, No. 1:05-cv-04811, 2005
WL3601936 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2005); Complaint, Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Cunningham
Trading Systems, LLC, No. 1:10-cv-00726 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2010); Complaint, Trading Techs.
Int’l, Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 180 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 1:10-cv-00715);
Complaint, Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. TradeHelm, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00931 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 2010).
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and was unenforceable due to patent misuse.16 As with Lilly, the Trading
Technologies patent, entitled “Click based trading with intuitive grid display of
market depth,” was later challenged in administrative review before the PTAB. The
PTAB ultimately upheld the patent. In this case, though, the district court cases had
not only upheld the validity of the patent before but in most cases had already reached
those judgments before the PTAB challenge was even filed—a procedural posture
discussed in more detail below.
These cases illustrate a troubling level of irrelevance for prior federal court
decisions—even repeated decisions—upholding a patent’s validity when the PTAB
is undertaking its review. This is not necessarily to the blame of the PTAB. The Lilly
litigations in the court and the agency were mostly contemporaneous, and one could
fairly attribute the duplication to a lack of judicial stays pending the outcome of the
PTAB’s review. Yet the Trading Technologies litigations were clearly sequential,
and multiple court decisions about the patent’s validity had already issued before the
PTAB entered the picture. And in both situations, the resources the PTAB expended
in upholding the patents were not a substitute; the courts still expended their own
resources to uphold the patents as well.
The problem of resource consumption is an important one, as it puts into
perspective the claim that valid patents will tend to survive review. Lilly’s patent
certainly did, in court as well as in the PTAB, but not without duplication. The
Trading Technologies patent also survived, but also with duplication—and the
sequential timing in that case additionally suggests that PTAB review was not
intended as an alternative to the federal court but was simply a result-oriented repeat
attack that disregarded prior judicial conclusions to the contrary.
Moreover, not all patents fare so well even with duplication. For example, during
the mid-2010s, CyWee asserted its U.S. Patent No. 8,441,438 against several highprofile technology firms including Apple, Samsung, Huawei, and Motorola.17 These
cases were also distributed across multiple patent-savvy judicial districts including
the Northern District of California and the District of Delaware and not, as the
increasingly common narrative goes, shoehorned into the Eastern District of Texas.18
When Google mounted a PTAB challenge against the CyWee patent, directed to a
“3D pointing device and method for compensating movement thereof,” multiple
district court cases were nearing judgment and one had already upheld the patent.19
By the time the PTAB had accepted Google’s challenge for review, additional
district court decisions had upheld the CyWee patent. Nevertheless, contrary to all

16. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC vs. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-04088 (N.D.
Ill. July 15, 2005).
17. CyWee Grp. Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:14-cv-01853 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2014); CyWee
Grp. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00140 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2017); CyWee Grp.
Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00495 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2017); CyWee Grp. Ltd. v.
Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00780 (D. Del. June 16, 2017).
18. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1462–68 (2010);
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of
Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 64–67, 70–72
(2011).
19. Google LLC v. CyWee Grp. Ltd., No. IPR2018-01258 (P.T.A.B. June 14, 2018).
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prior court decisions, the PTAB eventually concluded that the patent was invalid and
cancelled it.
This compounded problem, not only of duplicative litigation and resource
consumption but also of inconsistent judgments, raises grave concerns about the
relationship of the PTAB to the federal courts. These concerns belie the assurances
and expectations of the America Invents Act that valid patents would survive legal
challenges and that the PTAB would systematically be a cost-saving substitute for
the federal courts.
This Article describes these ill effects using empirical evidence of opportunistic
litigant behavior across the court-agency divide. It also traces these effects to
important flaws in the statutory design of the PTAB. Part I describes the problem of
duplicative litigation, first by explaining more fully the PTAB’s promise of
efficiency from substitution and then showing that much of the PTAB’s work has
instead been duplicative of other tribunals. Part II situates the causes of this
duplication in important features of the PTAB’s statutory design as well as in the
administrative ascendancy of the Patent Office itself. It also discusses partial
corrections, both judicial and regulatory, to the problem of duplication. Part III
emphasizes the need for comprehensive reform through targeted legislation,
beginning with an analytical framework for more efficient substitution and
concluding with specific legislative proposals.
I. DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION OF PATENT VALIDITY
For better and for worse, the current structure of post-issuance patent validity
review in general, and of administrative patent revocation in particular, reflects a
legislative promise at the heart of the 2011 America Invents Act.20 That promise was
to improve the efficiency of modern patent litigation, a system that had become
overburdened with pathologies of cost, delay, inaccessibility, and undesirable
strategic behavior. Apart from bringing about fundamental shifts in ex ante patent
examination to improve the quality of issued patents in the first instance, the AIA
also created a complex suite of ex post validity review proceedings to manage the
downstream problem of patents that should not have been issued but were.
The latter reform was bifurcated into two distinct approaches, one prospective and
the other retrospective. This Part describes that bifurcated solution, traces its effects
across the ecosystem of tribunals that are empowered to evaluate patent validity, and
identifies an important problem that has persisted—and, in some cases, has been
amplified—in spite of the AIA’s stated goal of improving patent litigation’s
efficiency.
A. The Promise of Efficiency from Substitution
The catalog of patent litigation problems that motivated the AIA is now virtually
a literature unto itself and need not be recited in full here, though a brief review of
representative scholarship is helpful to understanding and evaluating the particular
solutions that the AIA put in place. Scholars of law and economics have explored the

20. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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nature and origins of these problems across the patent life cycle and across the
various institutional settings that patents traverse along the way.
Notable studies of patent examination have shown that patent applicants enjoy
far-reaching advantages including statutory law that favors the issuance of patents,21
appellate review that disproportionately scrutinizes the denial of patents,22 and low
costs to entering the patent examination process itself,23 among others. Empirical
research in the same vein has revealed that the Patent Office itself suffers a number
of corresponding disadvantages, including resource constraints that hamper its ability
to reject patent applications with meaningful finality24 and lead the agency to allocate
inadequate time for its examiners to review applications with appropriate rigor.25
Institutionally, too, patent examination has received much criticism for being unduly
influenced by a Patent Office funding model that relies on maintenance fees for
granted patents and thus distorts the agency’s financial viability itself toward
granting patents.26
These patent examination problems have also given rise to a variety of
explanations and approaches to reform. Influential among the explanations for why
Patent Office examination not only is resource-constrained but also is likely to
remain that way was the rational ignorance hypothesis; that is, most patents will not
prove to have been worthy of expensive and detailed examination, that it is
impossible to know which applications will and which ones will not, and that it is
therefore inefficient to give rigorous scrutiny to all applications alike.27 On this view,
it is preferable to focus attention later, when both the value and the uncertainty of a
particular patent have become salient, and only on those patents that merit this closer
evaluation.28 The appetite for reform, meanwhile, frequently took issue with the
anomalous place of the Patent Office as one of the few agencies in the modern
administrative state that has not been delegated significant policymaking
prerogatives or legal authority to promulgate substantive rules and, as a result, has

21. Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 1007–08
(2013).
22. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 401–02 (2011); Jonathan Masur, Patent
Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 509 (2011).
23. Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
687, 687 (2010); David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65
VAND. L. REV. 677, 679 (2012).
24. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV.
613, 630 (2015).
25. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 552 (2017).
26. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 82 (2013).
27. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1497 (2001).
28. Id. at 1521.
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not received meaningful deference from the courts for its administrative
pronouncements.29
Patent litigation has received even more attention, including empirical attention,
due in part to the high stakes and increasingly rich availability of relevant data.
Research from industrial organization economics had long used patents as proxies
for innovation30 and patent citations as proxies for knowledge flows31 as well as
market value.32 In the past twenty years, this economic research turned toward the
institutional and doctrinal attributes of patent litigation itself.33 What followed was a
sustained empirical focus—one that continues to the present—in the legal literature
on patents, including a range of contested issues such as forum shopping by patent
litigants,34 the interpretation of patent claims,35 findings as to liability and as to

29. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 326 (2007); Arti K. Rai,
Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2053 (2009); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating
Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 317 (2011).
30. See generally NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY
(Zvi Griliches ed., 1984).
31. See generally Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Flows of Knowledge from
Universities and Federal Laboratories: Modeling the Flow of Patent Citations Over Time and
Across Institutional and Geographic Boundaries, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12671 (1996);
Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International Knowledge Flows: Evidence from Patent
Citations 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6507, 1998); Bronwyn H. Hall,
Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights
and Methodological Tools, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8498, 2001),
www.nber.org/papers/w8498 [https://perma.cc/2HJ2-TGD9].
32. See generally Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and
the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172 (1990); Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe &
Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16 (2005); Adam
B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents,
Profits, and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986).
33. See generally Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent
Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
6297, 1997), www.nber.org/papers/w6297 [https://perma.cc/UR4V-UAMT]; Mark
Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in the Protection of
Proprietary Research Tools, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7086, 1999),
www.nber.org/papers/w7086 [https://perma.cc/UBR8-UEPF]; Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh
Lerner, Preliminary Injunctive Relief: Theory and Evidence from Patent Litigation (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 5689, 1996), www.nber.org/papers/w5689
[https://perma.cc/F8JV-NHWV].
34. See generally Fromer, supra note 18; Vishnubhakat, supra note 18; see also Daniel
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).
35. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 223 (2008); Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim
Construction Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809 (2014); J. Jonas Anderson & Peter
S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent
Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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remedies such as damages and attorney fee shifting,36 and appellate review in the
Federal Circuit.37 This literature also shed light on problems of patent quality that
would lay important groundwork for expanded post-issuance review of patent
validity by interrogating the attributes of litigated patents themselves, including
value,38 uncertainty of scope and infringement,39 and intrinsic as well as extrinsic
correlates of selection into litigation.40
The narrative that emerged from this burgeoning literature was essentially that
patents were of increasingly questionable quality and were being asserted in a
litigation environment that tolerated and, at times, even rewarded abuse by entities
ranging from large and otherwise innovative companies to patent trolls and other
rent-seekers.41 Expanding the ability of accused patent infringers to challenge the
validity of patents was the correspondingly popular solution, and the key question
for this aspect of the AIA was how to do so.
The organizing principle that Congress ultimately chose was, in a word,
expertise.42 Although courts and, to a lesser extent, non-Article III forums for patent
litigation such as the International Trade Commission had long dealt with patent
validity challenges as a defensive response to infringement claims and occasionally

36. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved?
An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2012);
Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Explaining the “Unpredictable”: An
Empirical Analysis of Patent Infringement Awards, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 58 (2013);
Thomas F. Cotter & John M. Golden, Remedies, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds.,
2019); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 15 (2014).
37. See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Lee
Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s
New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013).
38. See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek
Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
39. See generally Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 103 (2013); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 71 (2013).
40. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283
(2011); Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (2015);
Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065
(2016); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 33.
41. See generally Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and
Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571
(2009); Jay P. Kesan, Anne Layne-Farrar & David L. Schwartz, Understanding Patent
“Privateering”: A Quantitative Assessment, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2019).
42. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1737–1741.
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in preemptive suits for declaratory judgment, they generally lacked doctrinal
expertise in patent law as well as scientific and technological expertise in the
inventive subject matter of patents themselves.43 The Patent Office, meanwhile, was
steeped in both forms of expertise and had already gained some institutional
competence with post-issuance review,44 beginning with the creation of ex parte
reexamination and further with the addition of inter partes reexamination.45
This technocratic approach to reviewing already-issued patents took two forms in
the AIA. The comprehensive law would already work a fundamental shift in the
initial examination of future patent applications. Priority in patent rights would no
longer go to the first to invent something but rather to the first inventor to file for
patent protection over it,46 creating pressure to disclose innovations to the public
more promptly or risk losing legal rights to more expeditious rivals.47 Moreover, the
scope of admissible evidence about the pre-existing state of the art was expanded,
pushing the quality of patents higher by raising the standard for establishing that an
invention is patentable at all.48
Still, given that many of the same examination pathologies of resource
constraints, asymmetric appeal, and rational ignorance still persisted, Congress
created a mechanism for immediate post-issuance review of those patents that the
agency would grant even under the new AIA framework. This mechanism was postgrant review (PGR), and it applied prospectively.49 From the time of a patent’s
issuance until nine months later, any person other than the patent owner could
challenge the patent’s validity.50 Nearly all of the substantive statutory grounds for
patentability were available, and all forms of relevant prior art evidence could form
the basis for the challenge.51
Also available prospectively were two additional forms of post-issuance review.
One was inter partes review (IPR), which would become available for AIA patents
nine months after issuance—that is, once the opportunity for post-grant review had
passed—or after the conclusion of a PGR on the patent if one had been initiated.52
Unlike PGR, IPR would allow only challenges to the novelty or nonobviousness of
the patented invention and only on the basis of prior art evidence in the form of
patents and printed publications.53 The other additional form of prospective postissuance review was covered business method review (CBM), which was patterned
after PGR in scope and prior art evidence but was limited to nontechnological patents

43. Id.
44. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997).
45. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 55–58.
46. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–93
(2011).
47. Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016).
48. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–93.
49. Id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 299–313.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299–313.
53. Id.

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 80

1/24/22 9:04 AM

2022]

PATENT INCONSISTENCY

69

that claim a financial product- or service-related invention.54 Like IPR, CBM became
available for AIA patents only after the window for PGR had passed or after the
conclusion of a PGR if one had been initiated.55 However, unlike IPR, CBM could
be used only defensively after the would-be challenger had been charged with
infringement of the relevant patent.56
The upshot of these prospective mechanisms was to provide prompt and vigorous
scrutiny of those patents that had survived to issuance, thus supplying at least some
of the incomplete information that made rational ignorance rational, followed by a
less vigorous but ongoing opportunity for further scrutiny as needed. There still
remained, however, the problem of all the patents issued prior to the AIA whose
questionable quality had spurred the reform in the first place.
To enable challenges against these pre-AIA patents, Congress gave the IPR and
CBM review systems retroactive effect as well.57 This meant that PGR would not be
available, but any pre-AIA patent that had not yet expired would immediately be
subject to IPR and CBM so long as the other requirements for these proceedings were
satisfied.58 This retroactive applicability was consistent with the overall desire of
Congress to vindicate the consensus around pre-AIA patent quality, though it posed
self-evident problems for the reliance interests of patent owners whose legal rights
and economic interests had just shifted underfoot.59
The retroactivity of IPR and CBM also created significant new problems, which
were only somewhat less obvious at the time, from the potential for duplicative
litigation and conflicting judgments from multiple tribunals over the same patents.
The superior expertise of the Patent Office had been the watchword for substituting
a system of predominantly judicial review with one that increasingly prioritized
administrative review.60 But what if, instead of a substitute, the PTAB became yet
an additional place to fight, adding greater cost to a litigation landscape already seen
as inefficient?
B. Evidence of Duplication
It is now clear from both data and doctrine that this risk of duplication and conflict
has, indeed, been realized. Moreover, because of how Congress structured the postissuance review proceedings of the AIA, the particular directions of this duplication
and conflict have cut squarely against patent owners, often with little regard for the
substantive merits of their patent rights. Patents whose validity has already been
adjudicated are frequently relitigated, but only where the initial decision maker
upheld the patent. As a result, patents that survive continue to be challenged

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 6(a), 18, 125 Stat. at 299–313, 329–31.
Id.
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Mixed Case for a PTAB Off-Ramp, 18 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 514, 517–521 (2019) [hereinafter Mixed Case].
60. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1737–1741; Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2,
at 53–54.

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 81

1/24/22 9:04 AM

70

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:59

repeatedly until they are found invalid, whereas a single finding of that patent’s
invalidity is conclusive.
1. Prior Findings in Context
In this regard, initial large-scale empirical research into the PTAB offers helpful
guideposts. Although only 12.7% of federal-court-litigated patents are challenged in
the PTAB, 86.8% of patents challenged in IPR and CBM proceedings are also
involved in litigation before the federal courts.61 Meanwhile, a 70% majority of
petitioners who challenge patents in the PTAB do so as a defensive response after
being sued for infringing those patents, following the so-called standard model of
PTAB substitution.62 The remaining 30% do so preemptively, before any litigation
is initiated against them, at least as to the patents in question, following the
nonstandard model.63 Yet these statistics answer the threshold descriptive question
of what court-agency substitution looks like. They say little about the extent to which
the PTAB serves as not just another forum for disputing patent rights but as an actual
substitute.
For example, in the case of IPR, a standard petitioner’s challenge in the PTAB
will reflect substitution only if the presiding judge in the underlying federal court
litigation issues a stay pending the resolution of the IPR. The same is true of a
nonstandard petitioner, who may strike first and preemptively in the PTAB but whom
the patent owner might still sue for infringement subsequently. It is rare (3.01%) for
an infringement action in district court, when it comes at all, to come after an IPR
has been filed.64 In such cases, however, a large majority of IPR petitioners (81.0%)
are the very ones who are subsequently named as infringement defendants in district
court litigation.65
Here, too, substitution requires the district judge to issue a stay pending the
resolution of IPR. Otherwise, the two adjudicators proceed in parallel, and the result
is simply a duplicative expenditure of resources. The tendency of judges, for their
part, actually to issue stays pending IPR is highly variable across jurisdictions and
over time. The variation in the rate of stays is good reason to expect that the PTAB’s
workload likely includes a considerable amount of duplication.
2. New Evidence of PTAB Duplication
That expectation is borne out by the results of a new study—whose findings are
reported as follows—directly examining the scope of duplication, rather than
substitution, in the PTAB. The study relied on a merged set of multiple sources into
a single comprehensive dataset.66 One source was of all patents whose validity was
challenged in a PTAB proceeding from the start of AIA review in September 2012
through December 2018. A second source was of all patents that were involved in

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 82

Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 69.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
The principal source for this data was Lex Machina.

1/24/22 9:04 AM

2022]

PATENT INCONSISTENCY

71

litigation in the U.S. district courts, the U.S. International Trade Commission, or the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims from January 2005 through December 2018. A third
source was of all substantive patent validity determinations by the PTAB from the
start of AIA review in September 2012 through December 2018. A fourth source was
of all substantive patent validity determinations by the U.S. district courts from
January 2008 through December 2018.
As an initial matter, looking solely at court-PTAB duplication, of the patents that
reached a final validity determination in the PTAB, 24.5% are patents that also
received at least one validity determination in the U.S. district courts. This alone is
cause for concern—that a quarter of the patents that come before the PTAB do not
reflect a cost-saving but instead are duplicating expenditures of judicial resources in
the Article III courts. What is more, the validity determinations of the courts are, for
reasons further explained below, predominantly findings that uphold the validity of
the patents in question. Where the PTAB invalidates the patent, any prior judicial
conclusions to the contrary are necessarily disregarded. Where the PTAB now
upholds the patent, any prior judicial conclusion to the same effect is wastefully
replicated.
Looking more closely at the 24.5% of patents that reflected court-PTAB
duplication reveals that 77.4% of this subset were not just adjudicated by the courts
as well but were adjudicated by the courts first. It is this majority of duplicatively
adjudicated patents for which the prior judicial conclusions upholding validity are
being disregarded. The remaining 22.6% pose problems as well. For these, the
administrative conclusion about validity came first while the judicial conclusion
came later, indicating that the parallel court proceeding was not stayed. Where the
PTAB upheld the validity of the patent, the later-acting court can only have reached
the same conclusion given the divergent legal standards that govern PTAB and
district court proceedings—meaning that the duplication offers no additional
information at the margin. But where the PTAB struck down the patent, the lateracting court might have upheld the patent instead. The latter conclusion would carry
no weight, as the single initial finding of the patent’s invalidity is conclusive, but it
would nevertheless reveal arbitrage as between the divergent legal standards.
There are even situations in which a district court may act first to uphold a patent,
but because the judgment itself is not entered as a formal matter, the PTAB in a
parallel proceeding will consider itself free to render a conflicting judgment striking
down the patent—and the Federal Circuit will disregard the first (judicial) outcome
even in the same case, reasoning that the first judgment was not truly “final.”67 This
unusually and controversially strict doctrine, the so-called absolute finality rule,68
further complicates the already problematic duplication that is apparently at work in
the PTAB’s caseload.
In practical terms, of course, the question of which adjudicatory institution will
finish first, the PTAB or the court, is not driven solely by the PTAB nor by the
Federal Circuit’s treatment of competing cases that are both substantially finished.
As noted above, the issuance of stays in court litigation pending the outcome of a

67. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Fresenius
USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
68. Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 274 (2016).
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contemporaneous PTAB review will affect whether duplication takes place. Of the
1300 contested motions for a stay pending inter partes review filed in the U.S. district
courts from September 2012 through December 2020, the top five districts together
accounted for more than half of all such motions.69 These were the District of
Delaware (176 motions), Northern District of California (160 motions), Eastern
District of Texas (153 motions), Central District of California (119 motions), and
Northern District of Illinois (66 motions). Not coincidentally, these are also the
districts in which patent cases filings in gross are also perennially the highest.70
The rates at which judges in these districts granted stays were highly variable both
as compared with each other and over time when tracking the grant rates as a threeyear average starting from the October 2012–September 2015 period and moving
quarterly until the January 2018–December 2020 period. From the outset of the AIA
trial proceedings, the Northern and Central Districts of California both began close
to a grant rate of 50%. With occasional variation between them, both rose
substantially to 72% and 64%, respectively.
By contrast, the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware both began
close to a grant rate of 30%, but the Eastern District of Texas declined to 11%,
whereas the District of Delaware initially fell to 17% during the mid-2010s but rose
steadily and substantially since, to 51%. Meanwhile, the Northern District of Illinois
began at a grant rate of 62%, the highest among high-volume patent districts, and
stayed relatively consistent until the mid-2010s. The number of motions for stays
began to decline starting in 2016, and the rate at which they were granted also began
to decline starting in 2017, so that the current three-year average stands at 33%.
Figure 1 summarizes these trends.71
There are also other tribunals to consider. Because the Article III courts have long
been the predominant forum for resolving patent disputes and remain the principal
competitors of the PTAB, the findings about duplication thus far are an important
new contribution to the policy discussion over the design of the PTAB. However,
neither the AIA’s intended substitution nor its observed duplication are limited to
Article III courts alone. Decision-making about patent validity in Article I tribunals
including the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Court of Federal Claims
(CFC) are also subject to the AIA and raise similar concerns. The overall share of
patents that are litigated in the CFC is quite small, less than one-half of one percent,
and so can be safely bracketed. The share of patents litigated in the ITC, however, is
larger by an order of magnitude, about 4.9%, and is nontrivial.
Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that the role of the ITC in the patent ecosystem
has grown, not diminished, in response to ongoing legal and institutional changes.
For example, the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,72 which raised the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief against accused

69. This subset of contested motions excludes motions that were mutually agreed or
stipulated to by the parties.
70. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, Year in Review Update (Jan. 2020) (on file with the Indiana
Law Journal); DOCKET NAVIGATOR, 2019 Year in Review (Jan. 2020) (on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
71. See infra Tables and Figures at Figure 1.
72. See generally 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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patent infringers, drove litigants from the federal courts into the ITC.73 The ITC
grants exclusion orders that are functionally quite similar to injunctions in equity, but
the eBay framework does not apply in the ITC, initially making it an attractive avenue
for mitigating or even evading the practical effects of the eBay holding.74 Meanwhile,
more recent precedents such as the Federal Circuit’s 2008 decision in Kyocera
Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission75 purporting to limit the scope of
ITC remedies have done little to dampen the enthusiasm of litigants for seeking out
the ITC.76
That the ITC overlaps with other forums is also empirically clear, although the
relevant data on this point precedes the AIA by some years. Because of the ITC’s
more factually intensive pleading standards, its more aggressive case management
and trial timeline, and its greater willingness to award injunction-like relief, the ITC
has certainly been a highly sought-after forum.77 However, its inability to award
damages and its non-binding force upon district courts means that its relief is “neither
complete nor final,” creating significant incentives to use the ITC for duplicative
litigation rather than for substitution against other venues.78
Revisiting the ITC in light of post-AIA data on patent validity review reveals that
much of the relevant activity traverses all three major settings: the Article III courts,
the PTAB, and the ITC. The share of patents that are asserted in the ITC and are also
involved in federal court litigation is 86.6%.79 The share of ITC-asserted patents that
are also involved in litigation but are not challenged in the PTAB is 64.2%.
Meanwhile, the share of patents that are asserted in the ITC and are also challenged
in the PTAB is 24.5%. The share of ITC-asserted patents that are also challenged in
the PTAB but are not involved in court litigation, however, is only 2.0%.
This means the large majority of patents from the ITC are also involved in court
litigation, and over a quarter of that court-ITC overlap (25.9%)80 involves the PTAB
as well. And although a relative minority of patents from the ITC are also challenged
in the PTAB, even that modest ITC-PTAB overlap almost always (91.8%)81 involves
court litigation as well. Among these adjudicatory institutions, the overlap between

73. See generally Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency:
Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529 (2009).
74. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 73, at 2–3.
75. 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
76. Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade Commission as a Patent
Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (2011).
77. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 63 (2008).
78. Id. at 64.
79. Notably, this is nearly identical to the 86.8% of PTAB-challenged patents that are also
involved in federal court litigation. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 69, and
accompanying text.
80. The remainder of ITC-court overlapped patents that are challenged in the PTAB
(86.6% – 64.2% = 22.4%) represents a quarter of the overall ITC-court overlap (22.4% / 86.6%
= 25.9%).
81. The remainder of ITC-PTAB overlapped patents that are in court litigation (24.5% –
2.0% = 22.5%) represents an overwhelming majority of the ITC-PTAB overlap (22.5% /
24.5% = 91.8%).

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 85

1/24/22 9:04 AM

74

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:59

any two institutions tends to spill over into the third to a noteworthy extent. Yet until
now, neither academic commentary nor public policy has taken an adequately
systemwide view of substitution or of duplication in post-issuance reviews of patent
validity.
C. Collective Action and Harassment in Patent Regulation
The problem of incomplete attention to substitution and duplication in PTAB
proceedings also compounds inefficiencies left over from the pre-AIA world. Rather
than replacing patent validity litigation in other forums, PTAB review interacts with
those other forums to generate more complexity. Much of that complexity is rooted
in the PTAB’s response to a collective action problem in generating patent invalidity
judgments, a response that creates its own potential for harassment. There has been
sparse judicial supervision (and, in some cases, none at all) over the PTAB’s own
management of certain forms of harassment. All that remains is a backstop of
political supervision, which creates its own ill effects.
The need for collective action against potentially invalid patents has been a
problem for half a century.82 Since the Supreme Court decided Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation83 in 1971, a final judgment
that a given patent is invalid creates defensive collateral estoppel upon the patent
owner in future cases as against all parties, including nonmutual parties who were
absent from the first case. In other words, the patent owner is foreclosed from
relitigating that patent not only against the opponent who obtained the judgment of
invalidity but also against any other parties whom the patent owner might later wish
to sue for infringement.84 The Court’s judgment in this regard relied heavily on
concerns that allowing patent owners to continue asserting their patents against
others even after a court had found those patents invalid would reflect poor economic
and legal policy.85
Yet that decision also dramatically altered the incentives of would-be patent
challengers. While the cost of invalidating a patent remains high—a fact that the
Blonder-Tongue Court itself noted86—nonmutual defensive estoppel against the
patent owner means that the benefit of a successful invalidity judgment flows to
everyone, not merely the challenger itself. In the language of public goods
economics, a patent invalidity judgment is nonrival because each can consume it
without detracting from another’s consumption of it, and the judgment is
nonexcludable because it is not feasible to restrict the benefit to those who have paid
for it.87 As a public good, something both nonrival and nonexcludable, a patent

82. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688–89 (2004).
83. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
84. Id. at 350 (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936)).
85. Id. at 334–48.
86. Id. at 338 (observing that “[i]n each successive suit the patentee enjoys the statutory
presumption of validity, and so may easily put the alleged infringer to his expensive proof”).
87. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 43–44 (5th ed. 1989); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures,
36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954) (using the term “collective consumption goods”).
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invalidity judgment will tend to be undersupplied.88 Though collective action would
be socially beneficial, each party’s preference to free ride on the efforts of others will
often result in no action being taken at all.
The design of the PTAB, especially inter partes review, alleviates this collective
action problem in two ways. The most direct way is to reduce the cost of obtaining a
patent invalidity judgment. To this end, the PTAB’s expertise and the resulting
reductions in expense, delay, and error were a strong invitation for would-be patent
challengers to challenge patents.89 The other way is to broaden access. Inter partes
review and post-grant review have no requirement of legal standing, so that anyone
“who is not the owner of a patent” may seek agency review of a patent’s validity.90
Naturally, there is no reason why these reduced barriers to entry should bring
challenges only to invalid or questionable patents. They permit easier challenges
across all patents and invite a variety of strategic behaviors. For example, after a
2013 jury verdict of $368 million against Apple, patent holder VirnetX was
challenged in the PTAB by New Bay Capital.91 Prior to filing, New Bay had offered
not to file its challenge if VirnetX agreed to pay it 10% of the jury verdict, roughly
$37 million.92 When VirnetX refused and New Bay challenged, VirnetX’s stock price
tumbled by 25%, reflecting a quarter-billion dollar loss.93 In fact, this stock pricebased PTAB petitioning approach was systematized into an investment strategy by
finance industry professionals, such as hedge fund manager Kyle Bass of Hayman
Capital Management.94 Congress, in turn, responded with proposed legislation aimed
at curbing financial trading based on PTAB petitions.95
PTAB design has also invited strategic behaviors that involve larger numbers of
parties and that have proven more persistent. The simplest form of this problem
began as serial PTAB challenges targeting a given patent, spread across multiple
petitions as well as across multiple challengers.96 For example, a majority of patents
in a variety of technologies were the subject of multiple petitions, including chemical
patents (60.6%), computer and communication patents (50.9%), and electrical
patents (58.4%).97

88. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
189 (1994).
89. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
90. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a).
91. See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 932–33 (2015)
(discussing the dispute and citing case documents).
92. Id. at 932.
93. Id. at 933.
94. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 74 (citing Joseph Walker & Rob
Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J.,
www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticalspatent-1428417408 [https://perma.cc/Q3SP-FMA9] (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM)); see also
Andrew Chung, Hedge Fund Manager Kyle Bass Escapes Sanctions in Drug Patent Case,
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2015, 2:50 PM), www.reuters.com/article/celgene-lawsuithedgefund/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-escapes-sanctions-in-drug-patent-caseidUSL1N11Y1S120150928 [https://perma.cc/UQ8Z-UGRM].
95. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b)(1)(C) (2015).
96. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 68.
97. Id.
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A more sophisticated form of this problem combines the incentives of district
court defendants who come defensively to the PTAB with the incentives of
preemptive challengers who make use of the PTAB’s lenient standing rules to attack
patents before, or without ever, being sued.98 One way to evaluate this trend is to
compare so-called standard and nonstandard petitioners as well as petitions. The
“standard” model of substitution is for a PTAB petition to come as a defensive
response to infringement litigation; the “nonstandard” model is for a PTAB petition
to come preemptively.99
Understood this way, the share of standard petitioners (individual challengers in
the PTAB who have previously been sued on the patent that they now challenge)
diverges systematically from the share of standard petitions (individual complaints
filed in the PTAB that include at least one petitioner who was previously sued).
Where the share of standard petitioners is lower than the share of standard petitions,
this means that petitioners who were not previously district-court defendants are
joining petitions filed by petitioners who were previously defendants.100 This
petitioner-petition divergence is especially high among drug and medical-related
patents (48.5% vs. 70.8%) and mechanical-related patents (53.1% vs. 70.2%).101
While this joinder among patent challengers likely reflects beneficial collective
action in a range of cases, it can also reflect harassment and delay, especially where
this collective action comes in the form of subsequent PTAB petitions that are joined
later to prior defendants’ PTAB petitions.102
Importantly, the statutory design of the PTAB contains limits to police this sort
of strategic behavior, but enforcement—especially judicial enforcement—of these
limits has proven elusive. For petitions that arise from an underlying district-court
litigation, the AIA imposes a one-year deadline from when the district court
complaint is served upon a defendant to when that defendant must seek inter partes
review in the PTAB.103 The Federal Circuit held in 2015 that PTAB decisions about
the one-year bar were immune from judicial scrutiny,104 but that precedent was
subsequently overturned en banc in 2018, imposing judicial review on PTAB
decisions.105 Later still, the Supreme Court in 2020 reversed the Federal Circuit’s
2018 en banc precedent, concluding that PTAB determinations about the one-year
bar are judicially unreviewable and reinstating the pre-2018 status quo.106 The
applicability of this one-year time bar to joinder has correspondingly fluctuated over
time.107 As a result of this uneven judicial supervision, the institutional backstop for
supervising the PTAB’s management of strategic behavior has, unsurprisingly, been
the political leadership of the USPTO. As a matter of administrative law and policy,

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
2020).
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this may be familiar and even appropriate. Adjudication that is conducted in agency
tribunals rather than in courts has long tended to vest final decision-making authority
in politically appointed agency heads, and this has continued into modern
administrative practice.108
However, this consensus view of agency design generally assumes an overtly
regulatory posture that does not necessarily map onto patent law. Whereas the power
and remit of most agencies are defined by reference to regulating some industry,
activity, or other segment of society, the Patent Office has long been charged with
the altogether different task of “handing out a small dollop of state power to dispersed
parties in the form of individual property rights.”109 This posture has long left the
Patent Office disempowered from making substantive political judgments.110 That
state of affairs, especially the agency’s lack of rulemaking authority except as to
procedural matters, remains in place even today.111 This means that the political
supervision of the PTAB is, at best, an uneasy fit with the prevailing view of patents
as property rights.112 The stability and certainty that are of chief concern in a wellfunctioning patent regime require mediating between predictable but short-lived
rules and unpredictable but durable standards.113 This is especially true where, as in
patent law, judicially developed doctrines change so quickly that they cannot offer
certainty even over the twenty-year life of a patent.114 Closely connected to the need
for stability and certainty in patent rights is the broader concern that an unduly
political valence will tend to undermine the ability of the Patent Office to make
credible commitments to innovators and investors.115
Indeed, the problem of credible commitment is independent of any particular
agency administration and independent of the merits of any particular Patent Office
policy initiative. For example, patent owners who perceived the PTAB in its early
years as being overly lenient with petitioners have probably welcomed the more
recent USPTO policies of limiting serial petitions under the General Plastic v. Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha framework116 and of notice-and-comment rulemaking to tighten

108. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2019); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative
Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch Way, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407,
412 (2013).
109. Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and Why They
Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559, 2561 (2019).
110. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1674–75.
111. See id.; Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1973 (2013) (“The PTO, however, has
not historically possessed the authority to engage in formal adjudication or rule making—the
two formal procedures that Mead indicates would likely warrant deference.” (citing United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001)).
112. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1721.
113. Id. at 1721–22.
114. Id.; John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 609, 614–15 (2009).
115. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1726–27.
116. General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 6, 2017) (designated by the PTAB as “precedential” on Oct. 18, 2017).
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the standard for construing patent claims in PTAB review.117 Yet what today’s
agency leadership can give, tomorrow’s can take away. A recent USPTO request for
information, which was issued during the transition from the Trump administration
to the Biden administration and which has proven especially controversial, illustrates
the point well. The agency during 2019 and 2020 designated two decisions, NHK
Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. and Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., as
precedential and binding upon PTAB decisions.118 The resulting NHK-Fintiv
doctrine represents a policy of denying PTAB petitions where a parallel district court
proceeding is so far along and so substantially similar in art and argumentation that
it would be best to conserve USPTO resources rather than undertake a largely or
entirely duplicative review.119 In fact, the NHK-Fintiv rule represents one of the most
clearly specified positions by the USPTO with respect to the substitutionary purpose
of the PTAB.
Given the late stage of the Trump administration during which this proposal was
published for comment, the political salience of the NHK-Fintiv rule is especially
high. As a result, the Biden administration now seems highly likely at least to revisit
the issue and potentially to reverse course in accordance with newly prevailing policy
priorities once those are announced. Thus, regardless of where one stands in the
debate over the policy itself, what ultimately matters is the political reversibility and
fragility of the NHK-Fintiv rule.
In short, the experience of the PTAB has been characterized by a persistent
potential for harassment and delay as a flip side of beneficial collective action, by a
lack of reliable judicial supervision over court-agency substitution, and by a backstop
of political supervision that is equally unstable. Even on their own, these features of
the PTAB represent a new and complex set of institutional design challenges for the
patent system. But what is worse, the significant court-agency duplication between
the PTAB and other adjudicatory systems compound pre-AIA problems and generate
more complexity, not less.
II. THE ARC OF DUPLICATION: CAUSES AND REFORMS
The problems of incomplete substitution, outright duplication, and strategic usage
of PTAB proceedings for problematic purposes were no doubt unintended by
Congress, but they were not unforeseeable. This Part explores the nature and causes
of the problems that Part I documented and described. The first set of explanations
all arise from the statutory design of the AIA itself and focus on the inter partes
review statute both because it is representative of the issues and because the body of
inter partes review proceedings accounts for the large majority of the PTAB’s
operational workload and policy levers. The second set of explanations are more
structural and track the institutional ascendancy of the USPTO since the AIA was

117. Final Rule, Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in
Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11,
2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
118. No. IPR2018-00752 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018); No. IPR2020-00019 (P.T.A.B. Mar.
20, 2020).
119. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing the NHK-Fintiv doctrine as an agency response to
inter-branch duplication).
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enacted. This latter set of effects do not flow unavoidably from the AIA’s statutory
design but do reflect well-understood patterns of agency behavior, especially agency
aggrandizement.
A. The AIA’s Statutory Design
The AIA’s statutory design affects duplication in PTAB litigation in four ways.
First is through the burden of proof that the PTAB requires, which is weaker than the
burden that Article III courts require. Second is asymmetric estoppel that fosters
disregard by the USPTO of prior judicial findings about validity even of the same
patents. Third is the lack of a clear statutory structure for staying litigation in federal
courts pending the outcome of parallel proceedings in the PTAB, resulting in high
variation in the rate at which judicial stays are actually granted. Fourth is the AIA’s
inattentive view of the ITC, which leaves important gaps with respect to a significant
institutional actor in the adjudication of patents.
1. The Agency’s Weaker Burden of Proof
The most persistent structural reason for duplicative litigation in the PTAB is its
weaker burden of proof. Petitioners must prove claims of unpatentability by a
preponderance of the evidence.120 This is in contrast to the more stringent burden of
clear and convincing evidence that a litigant must meet to overcome the statutory
presumption of patent validity121 and prove unpatentability, both in the U.S. district
courts122 and in the ITC.123 The doctrinal effect of this disparity is significant, as it
permits open disregard by administrative patent judges not only to disregard the
decisions of Article III judges even with respect to the same patents but also to reach
altogether conflicting judgments of their own in the PTAB (though the conflict in
underlying standards themselves means that these contrary judgments are not
inconsistent in the legal sense). Meanwhile, the origins of this disparity in the
legislative history and in the underlying assumptions of the AIA have also been a
point of considerable confusion. It is useful to consider these issues separately.
The doctrinal effect of these divergent standards became clear immediately. After
the AIA trial proceedings went online in September 2012 and as the earliest final
written decisions began to issue in June 2013, the PTAB observed in SAP America,
Inc. v. Versata Development Group, Inc. that neither the statutory presumption of
validity nor the burden of clear and convincing evidence applied to petitioners in the
PTAB.124 The PTAB in Google, Inc. v. Whitserve LLC put it even more clearly,
explaining that “[g]iven these differing evidentiary standards, the same evidence that
the jury found insufficient could meet the burden of proof in an inter partes
review.”125 The PTAB further observed that even conclusions that the Federal Circuit

120. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
122. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95, 97 (2011).
123. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
124. No. CBM2012-00001, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1097, at *4 n.4 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
125. No. IPR2013-00249, 2014 WL 4537504, at *17 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
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reached about patent validity under the clear and convincing evidence standard
would not foreclose a contrary PTAB conclusion about the same patent under the
preponderance standard.126
The Federal Circuit has largely agreed as a descriptive matter, though the
implications of this divergence remain contested. The court in Novartis AG v. Noven
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. agreed that the differing burdens of proof mean “that the
PTAB properly may reach a different conclusion based on the same evidence.”127
Writing separately in Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., Judge Newman further
recognized that district court judgments about patent validity are also often
“accompanied by the deferential standard applied to jury verdicts.”128
The similarly deferential standard of substantial evidence review that the Federal
Circuit applies to final written decisions of the PTAB129 entrenches the divergent
burdens even further and leaves little likelihood that appellate correction might close
the gap between conflicting judgments from the PTAB and the courts. Judge
Newman also elaborated on this concern in dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc in Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A.130 There, she urged that the substantial
evidence that can support an agency determination under the judicial review
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act is inapt for the purposefully trial-like
structure of AIA proceedings, especially in light of the increased risk to settled rights
and future investments from, among other things, the PTAB’s more lenient burden
of proof.131
The origins of this disparity reflect the need for reconsideration and reform as
well. The use of a weaker preponderance-level burden saw strong opposition
throughout the years-long legislative debate that would lead to the AIA.132 Notably,
this opposition was closely tied to the same concerns about duplicative litigation that
now confront the PTAB.133 To this, one may fairly respond that regardless of what
substantive preferences were sought during the legislative debate, the final legislative
choice is what controls. Yet the problem goes deeper.
The heart of the issue is summarized well in Joe Matal’s authoritative two-volume
Guide to the Legislative History of the AIA: “there simply is no requirement in the

126. Id. (arguing that “even if the Federal Circuit had definitively concluded [the Schrader
prior art reference] does not teach [the disputed technological concept of “Internet-based
data”] under the clear and convincing standard, it would not foreclose our determination that
Schrader meets the preponderance standard.”).
127. 853 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
128. 621 F. App’x 995, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
129. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
130. 820 F.3d 432, 436 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 438.
132. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. On
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet, 110th Cong. 56, 55 (2007) (statement of Gary L.
Griswold, President and Chief Counsel of Intellectual Property, 3M Innovative Properties)
(arguing that it is unfair to patent owners to allow patents to be challenged many years after
the fact under only a preponderance burden of proof on the basis of uncertain events such as
“public use and oral disclosures”).
133. Id. at 55 (warning of “serial post-grant challenges” and the loss of any “right to expect
quiet title at some point without facing an endless series of challenges”).
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law that the USPTO give any deference or weight to a district court’s decision with
respect to a patent.”134 This point arose in the context of precluding the USPTO, as a
matter of formal collateral estoppel, from reconsidering the same issues in its
administrative proceedings that courts have already decided.135 Strikingly, the reason
was that administrative proceedings in the USPTO were not merely subject to
different standards and burdens but were also fundamentally different in kind: unlike
civil litigation, the argument went, “the examiner [or reexaminer] is not attacking the
validity of the patent but is conducting a subjective examination of the claims in light
of prior art.”136
This supposed qualitative difference is starkly at odds with the prevailing view of
the AIA proceedings as adjudicative in nature rather than:
One important structural change made by the present bill is that inter
partes reexamination is converted into an adjudicative proceeding in
which the petitioner, rather than the Office, bears the burden of showing
unpatentability. . . . In the present bill, section 316(a)(4) gives the Office
discretion in prescribing regulations governing the new proceeding. The
Office has made clear that it will use this discretion to convert inter
partes into an adjudicative proceeding. This change also is effectively
compelled by new section 316(e), which assigns to the petitioner the
burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of
the evidence.137
In short, the AIA’s burden of proof reflects a poorly designed attempt to have it both
ways. The statutory text is clear about the preponderance standard, but the policy
behind it arises from a conflicted understanding about the purpose of AIA
proceedings as adversarial trial-type substitutes for traditional litigation. This
confusion does not merely mean that a patent that would have survived Article III
court review may fall to a weaker evidentiary showing in the PTAB. It means that
even a patent that actually did survive Article III review may nevertheless be
relitigated in a duplicative PTAB trial on the same evidence and be struck down.
2. Estoppel and Disregard for Judicial Findings
The divergent burden of proof in the PTAB also contributes to related problems
of estoppel and disregard for judicial findings. To be sure, there are reasons why
these tendencies toward duplication are not necessarily surprising, but these reasons
still do not adequately address the AIA’s basic aim of patent error-correction through
expert administrative reevaluation.
The tendency toward duplication arises in part in the Blonder-Tongue doctrine.
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.

134. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 639 (2012).
135. Id. at 638–39.
136. Id. at 640 (citing In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
137. 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also id.
at S1366 (Republican Policy Committee Legislative Notice); id. at S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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University of Illinois Foundation,138 a final judgment that a given patent is invalid
creates defensive collateral estoppel effect upon the patent owner in future cases as
against all parties, including nonmutual parties who were absent from the first case.
In other words, the patent owner is foreclosed from relitigating that patent not only
against the opponent who obtained the judgment of invalidity but also against any
other parties whom the patent owner might later wish to sue for infringement.139
The reverse is not true: a patent owner who prevails on the issue of patent validity
against one opposing party cannot use that finding to estop other, nonmutual parties
from arguing anew that the patent is invalid.140 In particular, this is because issued
patents are, by statute, presumed valid and must be proven invalid by clear and
convincing evidence.141 Thus, as a formal matter, no institution ever actually finds a
patent to be valid but, at most, merely not invalid. A finding that the presumption of
validity was not overcome in a given case leaves open the possibility that it may be
overcome in a subsequent case.
What is even more fundamental, however, than the estoppel principles that govern
patent validity is that the nature and origins of post-issuance review following the
AIA are themselves rooted in an intractable premise. In order to make it easier to
invalidate questionable patents, Congress had no choice but to make it easier to
invalidate all patents: after all, if it were already known which patents are of
questionable quality and which ones have merit, then post-issuance review would be
unnecessary.142 So, it may not be altogether surprising that the effectiveness of AIA
patent validity review proceedings comes, at least in part, precisely from the greater
ease with which they allow patents to be struck down. Perhaps that is the very point.
But even these accounts do not justify the current state of duplication. For one
thing, if the true thrust of substituting administrative review for review by other
institutions was actually to systematically weaken the survival rate of patents, then
the rhetoric of Patent Office expertise that drove the AIA’s bipartisan and bicameral
consensus rings hollow. For another, the background principles of common law
estoppel that have been in place since Blonder-Tongue are not the only relevant
forces at work in the structure of post-issuance review under the AIA.
In fact, the substitutionary choice that the AIA imposes—between the PTAB on
one hand and Article I and Article III tribunals on the other hand—comprise a
number of statutory provisions that, taken together, form an emergent institutional
border around the PTAB.143 But by its own terms, the border was never absolute and
left room for duplicative litigation.144 What is worse, a series of policy-driven
encroachments by the Patent Office did much to weaken the border even further in
the initial years after the AIA, especially between the PTAB and the federal courts.145

138. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
139. Id. at 350 (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936)).
140. A few scholars have discussed this scenario in analytical terms. See, e.g., Paul R.
Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 324–325 (2016).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
142. Vishnubhakat, FTC Testimony, supra note 5.
143. See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in Patent
Law, 51 AKRON L. REV. 1069 (2017).
144. Id. at 1080.
145. Id. at 1087–91.
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Recent retrenchments by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, as well as by
the Patent Office itself, suggest that the time is ripe for reform. The proper focus of
these reforms should be to minimize duplication, especially given the susceptibility
of the PTAB to arbitrage of divergent legal standards and other strategic behavior.
The current structure of IPR proceedings offers four distinct dimensions along
which to conceptualize substitution, and along which to minimize duplication:
(1) the identity of the party whose action triggers a choice between the
PTAB and some other institution;
(2) the relevant legal action that triggers the choice;
(3) the particular institution with respect to which the substitutionary
choice is being triggered; and
(4) the timing of the triggering action relative to the PTAB proceeding.
The IPR statute translates each of these into concrete terms. One example is (1) a
would-be IPR petitioner (2) who has filed a civil action challenging the validity of a
patent (3) in U.S. district court (4) before seeking IPR. Such a party is barred
altogether from pursuing the IPR.146 Another example is (1) a patent owner (2) who
has filed a lawsuit alleging infringement of the patent (3) and has done so in U.S.
district court (4) before an IPR has been filed. In such a case, the accused infringer
must seek IPR within one year of being served with the complaint or else cannot seek
IPR at all.147
Still another example is (1) a former IPR petitioner (2) who has litigated an IPR
to final judgment but now wishes (3) either to return to the PTAB or to go into the
U.S. district courts or into the ITC and (4) file a subsequent challenge on the same
patent claim. In such a case, the former petitioner is foreclosed from relitigating that
claim before the PTAB on any ground that was actually raised or reasonably could
have been raised during the first IPR.148 The former petitioner is likewise foreclosed
from relitigating before the U.S. district courts and the ITC as well.149
Still, important gaps remain. Although a patent owner’s infringement suit in the
district courts triggers a one-year time bar for seeking IPR, a number of PTAB
precedents now hold that a patent owner’s analogous infringement action in the ITC
does not trigger the one-year time bar.150 Likewise, although prior final judgments in
the PTAB create estoppel both inside and outside the PTAB, prior proceedings in the
district courts and in the ITC have no preclusive effect and do not foreclose any
relitigation in the PTAB. This is the very situation that has allowed the abovediscussed duplication to proliferate.
The problem of asymmetric estoppel, of course, is internally consistent with other
problematic structural choices embedded in the AIA and does much to compound
them. As discussed above, divergent burdens of proof mean that evidence of

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
2017).
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invalidity may fail to be clear and convincing but still establish a preponderance.151
Similarly, as discussed below, the need for patent claims to be construed in the PTAB
after their meaning has already been established in court has been an important form
of duplication as well.152 Filling these gaps and eliminating these disparities between
the PTAB and its adjacent institutions would do much to minimize duplication.
3. The Moving Target of Judicial Stays
Thus far, the discussion of what sources produce duplication in AIA trial
proceedings has focused on statutory provisions that shape the design of the PTAB.
It has also emphasized, though not assumed, a situation where the competing
institution has already concluded its reevaluation of the patent, perhaps years ago.
However, substitution across the court-agency boundary also requires considering
the other side of that boundary, especially where the competing institution has not
yet completed or perhaps even begun its own reevaluation of the patent. In other
words, while it is important to question PTAB duplication of already-resolved
questions of patent validity, it is also important to address the potential for
duplication in concurrent proceedings. Indeed, as time goes on and older pre-AIA
patents expire, an ever-increasing share of patent litigation will take place in the
shadow of immediate recourse to the PTAB.153
This means that where petitions for administrative revocation come before the
PTAB while the relevant patents are also involved in co-pending litigation elsewhere,
a concern for minimizing duplication must also look to how the competing
institutions respond to the PTAB’s actions. Where the PTAB decides not to
undertake review on the merits, duplication is not a concern, but where the PTAB
does institute review, the question of judicial stays comes to the fore.154
As described already, the rates at which stays are granted across judicial districts
and over time are highly variable.155 These grant rates have ranged from steady
increases reaching upwards of 72% in the Northern District of California to steady
declines reaching lows of 11% in the Eastern District of Texas.156 The origins of this
variation lie in two important and intertwined sources. One is the nonrandom

151. See supra Section II.A.1.
152. See infra Section II.B.2.
153. Empirical trends in PTAB litigation bear this out. Patents issued under the post-AIA
first-inventor-to-file regime have already grown to account for more than 37.5% of inter partes
review petitions. Mixed Case, supra note 59, at 520, 535. Meanwhile, challenges against
patents issued before the AIA but subject to the earlier-generation inter partes reexamination
have fallen from a high of about 75% early in the life of the PTAB to roughly 50%. Id. Patents
issued prior even to inter partes reexamination (but still susceptible to inter partes review)
have fallen even further, from 35.1% at the outset of AIA to about 10%. Id.
154. Although stays in the ITC pending PTAB review could also theoretically be a concern,
the rapid pace of ITC litigation makes such stays largely unnecessary. ITC litigation data
reveals that in over eight years of AIA trial proceedings, only five motions were even filed to
stay a Section 337 action in the ITC pending inter partes review: three were denied, one was
denied as moot, and only one was granted. See generally DOCKET NAVIGATOR,
https://brochure.docketnavigator.com/ [https://perma.cc/74WA-AUEP].
155. See supra Section I.B.2.
156. See supra Section I.B.2.
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choice—indeed, the highly strategic and outcome-sensitive choice—of judicial
districts in which plaintiffs bring patent cases.157 The other is the quality of
information about patent validity that courts can expect to get from the resolution of
a PTAB review.158
As to the choice of forum, it is not necessarily the case that judges in some districts
are inherently more inclined to grant stays while judges elsewhere are inclined to
deny them, though this is a possibility in certain contexts. For example, a number of
commentators have argued that the Eastern District of Texas, which for a time was
the leading venue for patent case filings in the United States, has been unreasonably
stringent in its past treatment of motions to transfer cases to other venues, purportedly
out of a desire to attract patent cases to east Texas and, once filed, to keep them
there.159 One might expect the same premises and criticisms to be levied against that
court’s treatment of stays pending PTAB review.
Alternative explanations may also be at work. One is technology-specificity.
Patent cases are likely to provoke different responses to motions for stays depending
on what technology is at issue. For example, the patent-to-product ratio for hightechnology products such as smartphones tends to be quite high, with numerous
subcomponents potentially susceptible to patent protection160 and so is more likely
to present greater complexity as to the number of patents and claims involved in any
given lawsuit. The ratio for pharmaceutical drugs, by contrast, is quite small161 and
so is correspondingly likely to present less litigation complexity. These
considerations of litigation complexity, in turn, are highly likely to affect how much
of the dispute is really likely to be resolved by a co-pending administrative revocation
proceeding in the PTAB, and how productive a stay would be.
Indeed, it has long been conventional wisdom that certain districts are more likely
to attract certain types of patent cases based on the technologies that underlie the
patents in suit, such as high-technology patents to the Northern District of California
due to its geographical coverage of Silicon Valley162 or drug and patents to the
District of Delaware due to the high number of pharmaceutical companies based in
the Delaware and New Jersey region.163 Supervening choices may overcome those

157. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing forum shopping in patent
litigation).
158. See infra Section II.B.3.
159. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1576 (2018); Klerman & Reilly, supra
note 34, at 263–265; Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in
Patent Cases: Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61,
73–74 (2010).
160. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1131 (2015).
161. Id.; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 445, 445–46 (2007).
162. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 40, at 1087; Fromer, supra note 18, at 1466 (citing Kimberly
A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 889, 934 (2001)).
163. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 307, 320–21 (2011); Marketa Trimble, When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 97

1/24/22 9:04 AM

86

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:59

preferences, of course, such as the high rate at which plaintiffs chose not to assert
high technology patents in the Northern District of California (perceived as a
defendant-friendly venue) but rather in the Eastern District of Texas.164
Still, empirical analysis bears out the conventional wisdom, including the rise and
fall of the Eastern District of Texas. The 2017 TC Heartland decision of the Supreme
Court held that under the special venue statute for patent cases, a defendant does not
“reside” simply anywhere it would be subject to personal jurisdiction, but only where
it is incorporated.165 The immediate effect of the decision was to make the Eastern
District of Texas an untenable venue for the great majority of patent cases filed there,
especially in high technology.166
As Figures 2–4 show, the Eastern District of Texas’s share of assertions involving
high technology patents, relative to other high-volume patent districts, rose in the
early 2010s and then declined—for Computers & Communications-related patents,
Electrical and Electronic-related patents, and Mechanical patents.167 The competing
districts that had initially lost these cases and then regained them were, indeed, the
Northern District of California (where high-technology defendant companies are
commonly headquartered) and the District of Delaware (where they are commonly
incorporated). Meanwhile, as Figures 5–6 show, the District of Delaware has
remained the predominant venue for Chemical-related patents as well as Drugs &
Medical-related patents, with little impact from the Eastern District of Texas either
before or after TC Heartland. Thus, there is good reason to expect that technologyspecific dynamics of patent case management—which are highly correlated with the
choice of forum—will affect the practical value of staying the litigation.
Beyond forum-specific influences on the granting of stays, there is also a question
of what information the court that stays its hand can expect to get from a co-pending
PTAB review. As noted already in the discussion of technology-specific dynamics,
considerations of litigation complexity are part of this calculus. A large and
complicated lawsuit may provoke a varying range of PTAB challenges, involving a
large number of inter partes review petitions versus only a few, involving many or
all of the defendants versus only one or a few, and so on. To this extent, defendant
behavior can exert a fair degree of influence over the conditions that will make a stay
more or less likely.
More importantly, however, a controversial practice of the PTAB itself has also
played a role in the granting and denying of judicial stays. That is the practice of
partial adjudication, which did much to undermine the substitutionary purpose of the
PTAB.168 When the USPTO first established its procedures in 2012 for the new AIA

Look at the Involvement of Foreign Defendants in Patent Litigation in the U.S., 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 530–31 (2010).
164. See generally Anderson, supra note 159.
165. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516–17
(2017).
166. See generally Anderson, supra note 159.
167. The technology categories used here correspond to those set forth in the National
Bureau of Economic Research taxonomy. See generally Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note
31.
168. See infra Section II.B.3.
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trial proceedings,169 it announced that after considering a petition for review, the
presiding PTAB panel “may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the
challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for
each claim.”170 This provoked controversy because the relevant statutory language
of the AIA appeared to be binary, contemplating either a full institution or a full
denial, but not a power of partial adjudication.171
The operation of this practice upon judicial stays was straightforward. A full
denial of review by the PTAB would signal to courts with co-pending litigation that
they were free to proceed, as there was no “reasonable likelihood”172 that the patent
would successfully be declared invalid.173 A full grant of review by the PTAB would
signal to the courts that there was value, perhaps a good deal of it, in holding
litigation in abeyance because PTAB revocations of the patents in suit might promote
settlement174 or might even render the court proceedings irrelevant altogether.175 Yet
only a partial grant of review, accepting some arguments as to some patent claims
while rejecting others, would be different. There, “the degree to which a PTAB
judgment would simplify litigation would necessarily be incremental” and thus less
attractive a case for staying the litigation.176
Meanwhile, the statutory text of the AIA is silent as to judicial stay in the context
of inter partes review, though the statute does specify how courts must consider stays
pending the outcome of covered business method reviews.177 In the face of statutory
silence as to inter partes review, courts have resorted to a standard of simplifying the
issues involved, avoiding the waste of costs that have already been sunk into the
litigation, and minimizing prejudice to the nonmoving party.178 This highly flexible
standard, in turn, is unlikely to generate consistency because it is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court and, as a result, is subject to highly deferential
appellate review.179
Thus, the court- and district-specific variations that already characterize patent
litigation to a significant extent are compounded even further as to the practice of

169. Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and
Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612 (Aug. 14,
2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 42, 90).
170. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (referring to a “determination by the Director whether to institute
an inter partes review”) (emphasis added).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
173. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Renewed Efficiency in Administrative Patent Revocation,
104 IOWA L. REV. 2643, 2674 (2019).
174. Jonathan Stroud, Shawn Ambwani, Sam Jaffna & Robert Jain, How PTAB
Proceedings Are Driving District Court Settlements, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Feb. 1, 2016),
www.iam-media.com/litigation/how-ptab-proceedings-are-driving-district-court-settlements
[https://perma.cc/TL4U-MPJ9].
175. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 173, at 2674.
176. Id.
177. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011).
178. Murata Mach. USA v. Daifuku Co., Ltd., 830 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
179. Id.; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 173, at 2674.
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granting stays, with little hope for consistency or uniformity. The result is even
greater potential for court-agency duplication.
4. The Largely Overlooked ITC
Finally, beyond the statutory choices reflected in the preponderance burden of
proof and of asymmetric estoppel and the statutory silence on judicial stays in inter
partes review, the AIA gives inadequate attention to International Trade Commission
proceedings in all but two important respects. One is that the statute does expressly
include section 337 actions in the ITC within the scope of the estoppel that inter
partes review,180 post-grant review,181 and covered business method review182
variously generate. The PTAB-ITC interface is not immune to the problems of
asymmetry in PTAB estoppel,183 but ITC actions are treated the same as civil actions
in the Article III courts. The other is that PTAB review is barred by a petitioner’s
prior challenge to the validity of a claim of the patent only if that challenge was made
in a prior civil action.184 The omission of prior ITC actions from this statutory bar is
not from inattention but that declaratory judgments of patent invalidity are simply
not available in the ITC as they are in the Article III courts.
Still, apart from these parameters, the AIA fails to address ITC-related dynamics
in two other respects that are, indeed, salient to the problem of duplicative litigation.
One is the trigger of inter partes review’s one-year time bar. A defendant who is sued
for patent infringement in a U.S. district court action must seek inter partes review
on the relevant patents within one year of being served with a complaint alleging
infringement, or else must forgo inter partes review,185 but no comparable provision
exists for the ITC, leaving the text unclear whether ITC actions trigger the one-year
bar. The USPTO has interpreted the statute narrowly, holding in PTAB decisions that
ITC complaints do not trigger the one-year bar.186 However, the Federal Circuit has
not yet ruled one way or the other on the USPTO’s view. As a result, an important
constraint on court-PTAB duplication, the one-year bar, carries only uncertain force
as a constraint on potential ITC-PTAB duplication.

180. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (providing that, after a final written decision in inter partes
review, the petitioner, its real party in interest, or its privy are foreclosed from raising patent
validity arguments that they actually raised—or reasonably could have raised—in any
subsequent civil action “or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) (same as to post-grant review).
182. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. at 330 (same as to covered
business method review, except that only arguments that were actually raised before the PTAB
are subject to estoppel).
183. See supra Section II.A.2.
184. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (establishing the bar for inter partes review); id. § 325(a)(1)
(same as to post-grant review and covered business method review).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The prohibition also applies if the defendant is a privy or real
party in interest of the would-be petitioner. Id.
186. See Brinkmann Corp. v. A&J Manufacturing, LLC, No. IPR2015-00056, 2015 WL
1347446, at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2015); see also Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No.
IPR2013-00242, at 6–18 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2014).
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The other problem is also a trigger, but one that allows PTAB review to go
forward in certain situations. The AIA’s transitional program for covered business
method review broadly allowed challenges based on all grounds for patentability just
as post-grant review does, and also broadly covered pre-AIA patents with retroactive
effect187—but, unlike inter partes review, was limited to a defensive posture. “A
person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered
business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy
has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement
under that patent.”188 This has left gaps as yet unaddressed by the Federal Circuit.
The USPTO has interpreted the standing requirement of covered business method
review as requiring either (1) that the petitioner, its privy, or its real party in interest
has already been sued; or (2) that the petitioner is at imminent enough risk of suit
that it would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment in an Article III court.189
What remains unclear, however, is whether being sued in the ITC would by itself be
enough to support standing for a covered business method review. It is certainly
plausible that the filing of an ITC action would give rise to Article III declaratory
judgment standing under the USPTO’s regulatory interpretation—and that the
resulting declaratory judgment standing would be enough to justify covered business
method review. However, as with the applicability of inter partes review’s one-year
time bar to ITC complaints, it remains unclear whether the USPTO’s interpretation
survives judicial review.
The Federal Circuit did hold in Return Mail v. USPS that the standing requirement
of covered business method review is broad enough to embrace a suit against the
U.S. government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, so that a federal agency can
properly seek recourse in the PTAB.190 Like the ITC, the Court of Federal Claims is
an Article I tribunal,191 suggesting an apt precedent. However, the question in Return
Mail was not whether a complaint in an Article I tribunal could support covered
business method review but whether the U.S. government was a “person” who was
capable of being sued in the relevant fashion.192 And even on that question, the
Supreme Court ultimately said no.193
These arguments are not to say that duplication between the PTAB and ITC is
equally as frequent or problematic as duplication between the PTAB and the courts.
The case against court-PTAB duplication is stronger and deserves principal focus.
Moreover, the recent sunset of covered business method review in September 2020
after its initially prescribed eight-year period194 suggests that it is a less urgent
legislative priority. Still, the larger point remains that among the courts, the ITC, and
the PTAB, the overlap between any two institutions tends to spill over into the
third—and that any proper systemwide view of substitution and duplication in
adjudicating patent validity must take greater account of the ITC.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
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Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 60.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. at 330.
37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).
Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 868 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a).
Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1858 (2019).
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B. The Patent Office’s Ascendancy
Turning now from statutory design effects to institutional effects from the USPTO
itself, there are four additional trends to consider. The first of these is the agency’s
judicially unreviewable power to grant or deny petitions for AIA trial proceedings.
Second is the standard that the USPTO initially adopted for construing patent claims
in PTAB trials, a standard that diverged from that of the U.S. district courts and the
ITC. Third is the agency’s past practice of partial adjudication, which was partly
addressed above in the context of judicial stays. Fourth is another instance of
judicially unreviewable power, this time to police the one-year statutory deadline for
seeking inter partes review.
All of these trends implicate the problem of PTAB duplication, though in some
cases, their actual effects on the problem are mixed. Moreover, some of these trends
have already provoked judicial and regulatory corrections, though these corrections
have also been incomplete.
1. The Agency’s Unreviewable Screening of Petitions
The absolute discretion that the USPTO exercises in granting and denying
petitions foregrounds much else that bears on substitution and duplication in the
PTAB. As a result, this powerful threshold discretion has a highly mixed valence, at
times contributing to the problem of duplication but at other times enabling
significant course correction and reform. This is due in large part to the irreducibly
political character of that discretion, a fact that has also received recent attention in
the debate over agency aggrandizement and the growing power of the USPTO vis-àvis the Article III courts.195 The discussion here is more limited, focusing on the role
that agency discretion in screening petitions for PTAB review plays specifically in
the analysis of substitution and duplication.
In the first instance, the discretion to grant or deny petitions for inter partes
review, post-grant review, and covered business method review resides with the
Director of the USPTO.196 For reasons of convenience, the Director does not exercise
this power directly but has subdelegated it by regulation to the PTAB.197 Once a
petition is granted and review is instituted, the PTAB also exercises the power to
conduct the actual trials and adjudicate the cases to a final written decision, and this
power resides directly with the PTAB.198 The agency’s current practice is that the

195. See generally Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1676–704 (identifying multiple modes
of USPTO aggrandizement through the use of PTAB-related powers conferred in the AIA).
196. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 315(a), 315(b) (setting the thresholds for inter partes review as
limits on what the “Director” may or may not authorize); §§ 324(a), 324(b), 324(c), 325(c)
(same as to post-grant review and covered business method review); see also Vishnubhakat,
supra note 1, at 1749–51 (discussing the allocation of pre-institution screening and postinstitution adjudication power in the USPTO between the Director and the PTAB).
197. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”).
198. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (delegating to “the Patent Trial and Appeal Board” the
authority and obligation to issue final written decisions in inter partes reviews); see also id. §
328(a) (same as to post-grant reviews and covered business method reviews).
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same three-judge panel of the PTAB who screens a petition on behalf of the Director
also adjudicates the petition if it is instituted.199
The availability of judicial review falls precisely along this divide between the
powers of the Director and those of the PTAB. Initial determinations whether to
institute review are “final and nonappealable.”200 However, assuming the PTAB does
institute review, cases that reach final written decisions are appealable to the Federal
Circuit.201 This dichotomy presented the first major test of USPTO power under the
AIA and, since the Supreme Court’s resolution of that test, has exerted profound
influence on whether safeguards against duplicative litigation will be left to the
agency’s political discretion or will be vindicated in the courts. That first test came
in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee,202 which presented two questions. The more
operational of the two was the standard for construing patent claims in PTAB trials
and is addressed later in this Section.203
The foundational issue in Cuozzo was how far the nonappealability provision of
§ 314(d) extended.204 The more modest view of this provision was that litigants could
not obtain interlocutory review of the decision to accept a petition and proceed.205
On this view, the right of a patent owner not to be subjected to a questionable
challenge was not legally recognized.206 Yet if and when the case reached a final
written decision, review would, indeed, be available as to all issues based “on the
basic administrative law principle that intermediate issues merge into an agency's
final order on the merits.”207 Where the PTAB errs in granting review, the court
would not take up the question immediately and risk systemic disruption, but any
such error would eventually be susceptible to appellate correction based on a full
administrative record. This view did not prevail.
The more expansive view was that § 314(d) barred not only interlocutory review
but all judicial review of the threshold screening function, even after the case reached
final judgment.208 This was also the USPTO’s view of its own powers209 and would

199. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(noting that the Patent Office “has determined that, in the interest of efficiency, the decision
to institute and the final decision should be made by the same Board panel”).
200. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e).
201. 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329, 141(c).
202. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
203. See infra Section II.B.2.
204. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
205. Brief for Petitioner at 46, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 737452, at
*46. The dissent below took this view as well. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d
1268, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The stated purpose of the ‘final and
nonappealable’ provision is to control interlocutory delay and harassing filings.”).
206. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1688 (observing as well that “if such a ‘right not
to stand trial’ existed, then by definition it would have to be redressed up front through
interlocutory review or not at all”).
207. Id.; see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (“[T]he
issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will merge in, the
Commission’s decision on the merits.”).
208. See In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273 (holding that “§ 314(d) prohibits review of the
decision to institute IPR even after a final decision.”).
209. Brief for Intervenor-Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office at 30–
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become what the Solicitor General later advanced as the government’s position
before the Court.210 This view prevailed, overcoming even the strong presumption in
administrative law favoring judicial review of agency action.211
The importance of this holding to court-agency duplication lies in the incentive
that it creates for the USPTO. The threshold screening function that the PTAB
performs—on behalf of the Director—is immune from judicial scrutiny, but the
merits adjudication that the PTAB performs later is not. Thus, for any action as to
the PTAB where the USPTO expects it has greater expertise and would be ill-served
by judicial interference, the agency has a rational motivation to characterize its action
as pre-institution screening rather than post-institution adjudication.212
In fact, reframing in this way is not especially difficult. In inter partes review,
instituting review requires considering the arguments in the petition, any preliminary
response filed by the patent owner, and finding “a reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
petition.”213 A likelihood-of-success standard means that the unreviewable
institution and the reviewable adjudication both focus on the merits of the validity
challenge.214
The question then becomes, what safeguards against duplicative litigation might
the USPTO wish to administer without judicial interference? The past decade has
revealed three significant examples, each of which has eventually reached the
Supreme Court. The USPTO has pressed an expansive view of its own discretion
each time, winning twice and losing once.
2. The Agency’s Need to Reconstrue Patents
The earliest test case of the USPTO’s power in a context that implicated courtagency duplication was the legal standard for construing patent claims in the PTAB.
From the outset, the rules that the agency promulgated to govern AIA trial
proceedings all adopted a practice of giving a patent claim its “broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”215 This
was in stark contrast to the standard of Phillips v. AWH Corp. used in U.S. district
courts, giving claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill
in the art.”216 The divergence of interpretive methods made it necessary for the PTAB
to interpret patent claims anew, even when courts or the ITC had already invested
time and resources to interpret the same patent claims in prior cases, creating
needless and wasteful duplication. Whatever the wisdom of that view, however, the
USPTO argued that its own policy judgment on the issue was conclusive.217

33, In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268 (No. 2014-1301), 2016 WL 737452, at *26.
210. Brief for Respondent at 44–50, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446), 2016 WL
1165967, at *34.
211. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140–42.
212. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1755.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
214. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1692.
215. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012).
216. 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
217. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142.
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As a matter of doctrine and institutional power, the USPTO prevailed on this issue
easily—indeed, unanimously, in the Supreme Court.218 The framing of the issue
made the outcome straightforward. The issue was not the wisdom of the “broadest
reasonable construction” approach versus the “ordinary meaning” approach but
simply who was authorized to choose.219 It was not Congress who chose to depart
from judicial practice in claim construction. By contrast, it was, indeed, Congress
who chose in the AIA to depart from the judicial standard of clear and convincing
evidence in favor of a mere preponderance standard.220 Instead, on claim construction
and on a range of other matters, Congress gave the Director authority to “prescribe
regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter and
the relationship of such review to other proceedings under this title.”221
Upon recognizing this delegation of authority to the agency, all that was left to
ask was whether the USPTO’s choice of a “broadest reasonable construction”
standard was unreasonable.222 The court concluded, sensibly, that it was not but
expressly declined to decide “whether there is a better alternative as a policy matter.
That is a question that Congress left to the particular expertise of the Patent
Office.”223 That question of optimal policy, however, does have a well-reasoned
answer. It is that PTAB claim constructions should follow the same interpretive
standard as the Article III courts, primarily to avoid duplication, but also for other
benefits such as structural fairness to patent owners and the reduction of forumshopping.224
The duplication problem lies in how using the broadest reasonable construction
differs in practice from using the ordinary meaning under Phillips. Giving a patent
claim its broadest reasonable construction means interpreting the claim to be as broad
as the patent specification, especially including the inventor’s disclosure, can
support. This usually results in patent claim scope that is broader than even the
inventor intends. Correspondingly, though, this also makes it more likely that the
claim, as interpreted, will impermissibly tread upon existing patents, technical
literature, and other prior art that cannot be made part of the inventor’s exclusive
patent right.
By contrast, the ordinary meaning approach of Phillips gives claims their
“ordinary and customary meaning,” i.e., what the claims would have meant “to a
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”225 This

218. Id. at 2142, 2146. Justice Alito’s separate opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
dissented from the opinion of the Court only on the question of judicial reviewability under §
314(d)—but joined the Court fully as to the claim construction standard issue. See id. at 2148–
49 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
219. Id. at 2142.
220. See supra Section II.A.1.
221. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4).
222. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2146.
223. Id.
224. See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to
Change the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (July 9, 2018), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3211380
[https://perma.cc/HNT8-HL8Y].
225. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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interpretation is to be done in light of the patent specification, which is “the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term and . . . acts as a dictionary when it
expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by
implication.”226 The administrative history of patent prosecution is another valuable
source of intrinsic evidence about patent claim meaning and should “inform the
meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the
invention.”227 Expert testimony, dictionaries, and other evidence that is extrinsic to
the examination and issuance of the patent is legally regarded as the least reliable of
all.228
This divergence does not merely permit duplication but essentially requires it. For
a given patent claim, the broadest reasonable construction is more likely to lead to
invalidation than the ordinary meaning under Phillips, primarily by exposing claims
to a broader set of potentially invalidating prior art.229 As a result, claims that have
been interpreted in prior federal court or ITC proceedings must nevertheless be
reinterpreted under the PTAB standard. Whether the PTAB reaches the same result
or disregards a coordinate tribunal to reach a contrary result, the problem of
duplication manifests either way. In this regard, usage of the broadest reasonable
construction standard in the PTAB presents problems quite similar to the application
of divergent burdens of proof, which also are more lenient in the PTAB and are more
skewed accordingly toward findings of patent invalidity.230 The only saving grace of
the claim construction problem is that it is not ossified by statute.
The related concern about structural fairness to patent owners goes to why the
USPTO chose the broadest reasonable construction standard for PTAB trials at all.
That interpretive method is certainly well-suited for patent examination ex ante
because it pragmatically assumes that applicants will draft claims broadly and,
accordingly, forces them to narrow those claims by adding specificity and detail until
it is clear that they have sufficiently drafted around the prior art.231 In this way, the
broadest reasonable construction standard acts as an information-forcing penalty
default rule.232 In fact, the same interpretive method has also long been used in
reexamination ex post for the same reason.233 Assuming a broad remit for already-

226. Id. at 1321.
227. Id. at 1317.
228. Id. at 1318–19.
229. See, e.g., Calvin M. Brien, An Empirical Analysis of Patent Validity in Inter Partes
Reviews Through the Lens of KSR, 46 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 426 n.82 (2018) (noting that “[t]he
broadest reasonable interpretation standard arguably results in a broader claim construction
than the so-called Phillips standard, which could explain the high likelihood of invalidation at
the PTAB”); see also Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) (characterizing the court’s own claim construction standard of
ordinary and customary meaning as “more stringent” than the broadest reasonable construction
employed by the PTAB).
230. See supra Section II.A.1.
231. Janis, supra note 44, at 63; In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
232. See generally R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and
the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (2002) (discussing the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel as an information-forcing penalty default rule in patent examination).
233. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 581 (2008); Janis, supra note 44, at 64.
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issued patent claims subjects patent owners to the same pressure, similarly forcing
them to narrow those claims as needed to avoid treading on prior art.
However, this pressure is unnecessary in AIA trial proceedings, where patent
owners cannot enlarge the scope of their already-issued claims, but can only define
or narrow the scope of their claims as originally issued.234 Moreover, the right to
amend is not nearly as robust in PTAB trials as it is in examination or reexamination,
where amendment is central to the entire process. The AIA grants only a right to
make a motion to amend,235 and the frequency with which the PTAB fully grants
such motions has been consistently low from the start, at rates at or lower than ten
percent.236 Until the en banc Federal Circuit decided Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal in
October 2017, the USPTO had improperly given patent owners the burden of proof
in motions to amend as well, making amendments still harder to come by.237
Recognizing these problems and responding in particular to concerns about
duplication and the waste of PTAB resources, the USPTO recently reversed its policy
on claim construction.238 Following notice-and-comment rulemaking, the USPTO
amended its regulations to provide that patent claims in the PTAB “shall be construed
using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim
in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).”239 The rule specifically addressed Phillips
by adopting “the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by
one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.”240
The rule also provided that the PTAB would consider “[a]ny prior claim construction
determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before
the [ITC], that is timely made of record.”241
The USPTO’s concern with avoiding duplication was central to this regulatory
reform, and the final rule articulated it. The high level of empirically observed
overlap between the PTAB and other tribunals, explained the agency, “favors using

234. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); see also Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 224, at 3.
235. Even this is limited by statute to one motion as a matter of right, with additional
motions allowed only by mutual agreement or in the regulatory discretion of the USPTO. 35
U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)–(2).
236. Vishnubhakat, supra note 59, at 519, 528 (citing a series of the PTAB’s own internal
studies confirming these findings).
237. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). Following Aqua Products, the chief judge
of the PTAB in November 2017 issued a guidance memorandum on implementing the new
burden of proof. Memorandum from David P. Ruschke, Chief Admin. Pat. J., U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., to the Pat. Trial & Appeal Bd. (Nov. 21, 2017), www.perma.cc/DW9NTEA3. Following a 2019 notice of proposed rulemaking, the USPTO formalized its post-Aqua
Products guidance in December 2020. See Rules of Practice to Allocate the Burden of
Persuasion on Motions to Amend in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,923 (Dec. 21, 2020) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
238. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,221 (May 9, 2018) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
239. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,345 (Oct. 11,
2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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a claim construction standard in AIA proceedings that is the same as the standard
used by federal courts and the ITC.”242 The agency also agreed that “[u]sing the same
claim construction standard across the fora would increase efficiency, as well [as]
reduce cost and burden because parties would only need to focus their resources to
develop a single set of claim[] construction arguments.”243
3. The Agency’s Practice of Partial Adjudication
Despite this initial victory, the next major test of the USPTO’s power proved to
be a retrenchment, and it implicated the problem of PTAB duplication even more
than divergent claim construction had. This was the agency’s practice of only partly
adjudicating AIA trial petitions. The practice was rooted in one view of agency
efficiency, though it was an unduly narrow view. Its principal impacts upon courtagency duplication were twofold—the dilution of judicial stay practice as briefly
discussed already244 and, more directly, the weakened application of the AIA’s
estoppel provisions. Partial adjudication also gave rise for a time to the controversy
over redundant grounds by which the PTAB itself tried understandably to manage
duplicative arguments within petitions but did so in a way that created larger
concerns about unchecked agency discretion and the constitutional separation of
powers.245
Partial adjudication began with partial institution. Under original AIA trial
practice rules, a PTAB panel reviewing a petition could “authorize the review to
proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of
unpatentability asserted for each claim.”246 Where only certain portions of a petition
were instituted, only those portions would be litigated on the merits and eventually
adjudicated in the PTAB’s final written decision.247
Under this arrangement, estoppel effects are an immediately salient question. All
estoppel provisions across all AIA trial proceedings first require a final written
decision.248 This already creates a possibility that the scope of estoppel might be
limited in accordance with the scope of the adjudication. Even the broad language
that estoppel applies to “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised”249 is cabined to arguments that were available to the petitioner “during

242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 51,342 (citing Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2).
Id. at 51,344.
See supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text.
See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Non-Doctrine of Redundancy, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777 (2018).
246. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
247. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1316–17
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)–(2) (limiting estoppel to an inter partes review “that results in
a final written decision”); id. § 325(e)(1)–(2) (limiting estoppel to a post-grant review “that
results in a final written decision”); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §
18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (limiting estoppel to a covered business method review “that
results in a final written decision”).
249. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)–(2). This applies to inter partes review and post-grant review
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that inter partes review” (or post-grant review or covered business method
review).250
If the time during a proceeding was deemed to begin with the filing of the petition,
then estoppel could foreclose even arguments that the petitioner raised in its petition
but that the PTAB never instituted and thus never gave a chance to litigate. This
would create obvious due process concerns by depriving petitioners of both an initial
opportunity for a PTAB review and any later opportunity due to estoppel.251 Those
due process concerns would carry far less force, of course, where the petitioner failed
to include the relevant arguments in the petition at all.252
But if the time during a proceeding was deemed to begin only if and when the
PTAB granted institution, then the problem of duplication would replace that of due
process. Only arguments that were raised or that reasonably could have been raised
after institution would be subject to estoppel, but all of the petitioner’s other
arguments would remain available for relitigation even after a final written decision
by the PTAB. Indeed, this was the very position that the USPTO took as to the
estoppel effects of its partial institution practice.253
The USPTO probably chose correctly between its available options: undermine
estoppel and tolerate duplication, or else maintain estoppel at the risk of offending
due process. Yet it was the agency’s own flawed practice of partial adjudication that
forced the choice. Similarly, the negative effect of partial institution on judicial stays
and, by extension, on the problem of court-agency duplication as already discussed254
was also a result of a policy tradeoff by the USPTO. In that regard, accepting some
arguments for review and rejecting others reduced the clarity and quality of
information available to judges who were considering stays. Meanwhile, the PTAB
was understandably looking to its own institutional benefit by reducing its workload
and streamlining the issues before it for adjudication.255
In this conflict between the supervening legislative policy interest in promoting
PTAB review as a substitute rather than a wasteful duplicate for other forums of
litigation and the USPTO’s own past policy choices in favor of its own insular
interests, the resolution eventually came from the AIA’s text. When the Supreme
Court in 2018 rejected the validity both of partial institution and of partial
adjudication,256 its grounds were chiefly textual. The error in the Federal Circuit’s
contrary holding below was also textual in notable respects.

but not covered business method review, which forecloses only arguments that were actually
raised.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. See, e.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-1067, 2017
WL 3278915, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017).
252. See, e.g., Asetek Danmark A/S v. CoolIT Sys. Inc., No. 19-cv-00410-EMC, 2019 WL
7589209, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2019); Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. CV 163714 GW (AGRx), 2018 WL 7456042, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2018).
253. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (noting the USPTO argument that “the denied ground never became part of the IPR”).
254. See supra Section II.A.3.
255. Vishnubhakat, supra note 173, at 2645 (discussing partial institution as “both a policy
lever and a case management lever” in the PTAB’s control over its own docket).
256. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
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In creating partial institution, the USPTO’s rationale that the rule comported with
the AIA was little more than a recitation of its power to “prescribe regulations . . .
establishing and governing inter partes review.”257 To this might have been added
the logical principle, common in the law, that the greater includes the lesser.258 Thus,
the grant of full institution power might also grant a lesser included power of partial
institution; so, too, for denial.259
During litigation, the USPTO turned more specifically textual. The relation
between the institution decision and the final written decision was of key importance.
The statute that governs institution, § 314(a), refers specifically to “claims
challenged in the petition.”260 By contrast, the statute that governs final written
decisions, § 318(a), refers instead to “any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner.”261 The Federal Circuit agreed that “the differing language implies a
distinction between the two subsections such that § 318(a) does not foreclose the
claim-by-claim approach” of the PTAB in adjudicating only the claims on which it
had previously granted partial institution.262
A majority of the Supreme Court squarely rejected that reading. The grant in §
314 of authority to determine “whether to institute” was a binary grant.263 The “partydirected, adversarial process” that Congress created in AIA trial proceedings
reflected “structural choices” that were no less “deserving of judicial respect” than
the text itself.264 The claim-by-claim approach failed as well. The USPTO had argued
that the requirement in § 314(a) of the petitioner’s likelihood of success as to “at least
1 of the claims challenged in the petition” commanded a claim-by-claim approach
that carried through to the § 318(a) requirements for a final written decision.265 The
Court noted instead that § 314(a) specifically does not require evaluating every claim
but only the likelihood of success on “at least 1” claim:
Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn't matter whether the
petitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims; the Director need
not even consider any other claim before instituting review. Rather than
contemplate claim-by-claim institution, then, the language anticipates a

257. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850) (holding that the power of Congress
under Article I to create the lower federal courts includes the lesser power to define their
jurisdiction); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the
Ethics Act’s grant of plenary power to the Office of Independent Counsel also grants the lesser
included power to “participat[e] in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation . . . that
such independent counsel considers necessary”).
259. Vishnubhakat, supra note 173, at 2652; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 245, at
793–94.
260. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (requiring “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”).
261. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (requiring the final written decision to address “the patentability
of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner”).
262. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
263. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018) (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 1355.
265. Id. at 1356.
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regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies
review of all.266
Though the Court’s opinion did not address it, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning on
differing language was questionable as well. It is true that § 314(a) refers to “claims
challenged in the petition” while § 318(a) refers to “claim[s] challenged by the
petitioner.” However, making this comparison in isolation ignores the remaining text
of § 318(a), that the final written decision must address “the patentability of any
patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section
316(d).”267 When it comes to the petitioner and their petition, the requirements of the
final written decision statute do not diverge at all from the requirements of the
institution statute. There is merely the further requirement that the final written
decision must also address new claims introduced by the patent owner.
Moreover, though the opinion of the Court declined to engage with the policy
wisdom of partial institution and partial adjudication, the respective dissents of
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer diverged from the majority’s statutory reading and its
impacts on PTAB case management.268 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was especially
trenchant, noting that even under the binary choice now remaining, the PTAB could
simply issue full denials with explanations of those arguments that merited review
and those that did not.269 By these decisional roadmaps, petitioners could simply
refile “new or amended petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds unworthy of
inter partes review”—leading back to the same streamlining that partial institution
had more promptly created.270 On this view, the whole exercise was a waste of the
PTAB’s time and was, if anything, a recipe of duplicative filing in the PTAB itself.271
But this was not so. Justice Ginsburg’s mock proposal was, in fact, a concise
statement of precisely why the Court’s rejection of partial adjudication actually
fosters a policy of internal efficiency272—and, as an added benefit, does away with
the problems of estoppel and judicial stays that past USPTO practice had fostered.
In the post-SAS Institute world of binary institution, petitioners must now “pare down
their challenges in order to balance the hope of full institution against the risk of full
denial.”273 The PTAB’s decisions will, indeed, be roadmaps as Justice Ginsburg
noted, but not only for unsuccessful petitioners to refile without undue guesswork.274
These more stringent decisions on binary institution will also channel future
petitioners to “file challenges that are more likely in the first place to be fully granted
than fully denied.”275
Another new study, whose findings are reported as follows, seems to bear out this
expectation of greater dynamic efficiency. Briefly put, filing a PTAB trial petition

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
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now carries a new downside risk. Sufficiently meritorious petitions will continue to
be instituted fully, and sufficiently defective ones will continue to be denied fully.
Yet a petition with a more even mix of winning and losing arguments might be fully
rejected based on the PTAB’s discretion. As a result, the overall risk of filing a PTAB
petition has grown after SAS Institute. Accordingly, the expected result should be a
decline in the number of litigants who seek PTAB review. Conditional on seeking
PTAB review, though, there should be a rise in the number of petitions relative to
the number of disputes, as petitioners distribute their challenges across multiple
petitions as a hedge against full denial.
Indeed, this is what came to pass based on PTAB trial filings from the months
before and after the SAS Institute decision. The number of disputes (where a dispute
is defined as a set of petitions between the same petitioner and patent owner) declined
by 6.3% from the four-month period just before SAS Institute to the four-month
period just after. The number of individual petitions, meanwhile, rose by 8.8% across
the same period. Looking only at inter partes review, the number of disputes fell by
2.2% while the number of petitions rose by 14.9%. Figure 9 summarizes these
findings.276
Thus, though the USPTO may not have recognized it and though the Supreme
Court majority did not even address the issue in SAS Institute, the end of partial
institution and partial adjudication has been a net gain in disciplining extravagant
petitioning and in eliminating the ill effects on PTAB estoppel and judicial stays,
resulting in a measure of progress toward reducing duplication.
4. The Agency’s Self-Policed Statutory Deadline
The most recent test of the USPTO’s power has been oversight of the statutory
deadline for seeking inter partes review. This enforcement issue has also been the
duplication-related doctrine that has seen the most judicial reversal and uneven
enforcement.277 Unlike claim construction and partial adjudication, it is currently an
open problem. Compared with AIA trial proceedings, the timing for filing an inter
partes review is more flexible.278 If the petitioner has not yet been sued for infringing
the relevant patent, the inter partes review petition can be filed at any time. If the
petitioner has been sued, then the petition must come within one year from the date
when the petitioner was served (or when its privy or real party in interest was served)
with the court complaint.279
The bulwark of this one-year deadline against court-agency duplication lies in the
choice it forces upon district court defendants. Before substantial time and resources
have been invested in the Article III proceeding, they must either commit to seeking
administrative review in the PTAB or else forgo it altogether.280

276. See infra Tables and Figures at Figure 9.
277. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
278. A petition for post-grant review must be filed within the first nine months after the
patent was granted. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). A petition for covered business method review can be
filed only in response to a district court lawsuit. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011).
279. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
280. Vishnubhakat, supra note 143, at 1088.
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Prior empirical results also confirm that the one-year deadline acts as a strong and
meaningful constraint on standard petitioners (those who have previously been sued
on the patents they now challenge281), and that the defensive posture of standard
petitioning represents the primary usage of inter partes review. As discussed already
in the context of PTAB joinder and the delicate balance it reflects between beneficial
collective action and harassment, nonstandard petitioners in inter partes review
frequently join the challenges brought by standard petitioners.282
Closely related to this petitioner strategy is the time lag between when patents are
asserted in the courts and when they are first challenged in the PTAB.283 There are
two measures of this lag. One is what may be termed the “first court/first PTAB” lag,
measured from the first inter partes reviews of patents back to their earliest
respective court litigations.284 The other is the “last court/first PTAB” lag, measured
from the first inter partes review back to their most recent pre-PTAB court
litigations.285 The distributions of these lags offer clues about how frequently inter
partes review is being used defensively—and, thus, how much meaningful work the
one-year deadline is doing to guard against court-agency duplication.
For the first court/first PTAB lag, nearly 23.4% of petitions exceed the one-year
deadline, reaching upwards of three years in some cases.286 This is to be expected,
especially for repeatedly asserted patents, because any of the various defendants may
be the one to bring the first PTAB challenge.287 Yet most petitions come within the
one-year deadline, distributed symmetrically at a median of six months and with a
modal spike at the one-year mark.288
The last court/first PTAB lag is more tightly distributed with only 11.4% of
petitions exceeding the one-year deadline and with a sharper modal spike at the oneyear mark.289 This is also to be expected, as earlier lawsuits against others are likely
to have revealed useful information about the patent owner's enforcement strategy,
requiring less time to decide whether and how to mount a PTAB challenge.290
Meanwhile, the reduced share of 11.4% of petitions that comes after one year is
virtually all nonstandard.291 Figures 10–11 show these distributions.
The upshot is that inter partes review is, indeed, chiefly a defensive response to
existing litigation and does substantially implicate the potential for court-agency
duplication. The one-year time bar for bringing inter partes review is a
correspondingly important structural pillar in the substitutionary boundary between
the PTAB and other tribunals.292 The modal spikes at the one-year mark in both time

281. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
283. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 75.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 76.
287. Id. at 75.
288. Id. at 76.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. Indeed, the only way this conclusion would not hold true is if there were systematic
nonenforcement of the one-year deadline.
292. Vishnubhakat, supra note 143, at 1082.
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distributions indicate especially that would-be petitioners work to the statutory
deadline and will take as much time as agency enforcement actually tolerates in
practice.293
Yet for all its importance, concerns about lax enforcement of the one-year bar
were long underappreciated. The USPTO argued that PTAB determinations about
the one-year deadline were judicially unreviewable under § 314(d), just like its
decisions whether to institute and its practice of partial institution.294 The Federal
Circuit initially accepted this argument in its 2015 panel opinion in Achates
Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.295 However, pressure for judicial
intervention continued to mount, and in 2018 the Federal Circuit reversed itself en
banc in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.296 The court in Wi-Fi One expressly
recognized the boundary-enforcing function of the one-year deadline and agreed it
was “fundamentally different” from the routine institution decisions that the Supreme
Court had immunized from judicial scrutiny in Cuozzo.297
Given the persistent controversy over this highly important safeguard of courtagency substitution and the high-profile turnabout of the Federal Circuit, it is helpful
to clarify the stakes of the USPTO’s position. The reason for skepticism at USPTO
self-enforcement of the one-year deadline is not that the PTAB is disproportionately
error prone or that internal oversight by the agency's political leadership is
systematically inferior, let alone that the PTAB would engage in willful disregard of
statutory constraints.298 The problem of judicial non-supervision is more subtle.
The one-year deadline itself is triggered not only by serving a complaint upon a
defendant who goes on to seek inter partes review. It also constrains court defendants
that may turn out to be privies or real parties in interest as to other entities that go on
to seek inter partes review. Deciding what circumstances satisfy these relational
criteria is a highly case-specific enterprise. Thus, the real value of judicial oversight,
especially in the early years of AIA trials, would have been prompt appellate-course
correction and the development of uniform guidance for the PTAB. Wi-Fi One did
bring en banc resolution, but the early error of Achates still squandered a valuable
opportunity.
Unfortunately, even that en banc resolution did not hold. In 2020, the Supreme
Court held in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP that the presumption
favoring judicial review of agency action—which carried the day in Wi-Fi One—
was sufficiently rebutted as it was in Cuozzo.299 By its holding in Thryv, the Court
has once again restored the pre-2018 status quo of Achates, leaving PTAB decisions
as to the one-year time bar judicially unreviewable and entirely self-policed by the
USPTO.

293. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 76.
294. Vishnubhakat, supra note 143, at 1084–86; Vishnubhakat, supra note 173, at 2651–
52; Vishnubhakat, supra note 245, at 791.
295. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
296. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
297. Id. at 1374; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 143, at 1087–88.
298. Vishnubhakat, supra note 143, at 1082 (noting that, “[t]o the contrary, the Patent
Office can be quite politically responsive, and stakeholder complaints about disfavored agency
policies can lead to dramatic reversals”).
299. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1373–74 (2020).

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 114

1/24/22 9:04 AM

2022]

PATENT INCONSISTENCY

103

As a result, Thryv also represents the current state of the USPTO’s ascendancy as
an institutional power center in the patent system. The Agency’s discretion over
institution decisions is broad, and its attempts to characterize many of the PTAB’s
structural features as institution-related have been successful more often than not.
The result is that the duplication observed in PTAB trials with respect to the work of
other tribunals, is not solely a result of the AIA’s statutory design. In significant part,
that duplication is also a result of the USPTO’s expansive views about its own power
and primacy.
C. Recent USPTO Attention to Duplication
It is essential, therefore, that any serious assessment of reform must begin with
the USPTO itself. Indeed, in the PTAB’s most recent years, as problems of
duplication have grown to the scale documented here, the Agency itself has paid
correspondingly greater attention to calls for reconsideration and reform. In this
effort, the leadership of the PTAB and of the USPTO as a whole have made moves
to address internal as well as external duplication.
1. Agency Reaction to Internal Duplication
A discussion of internal duplication within the PTAB may seem odd. The
duplication problem, as defined thus far, has focused on the interaction of the PTAB
with other tribunals: Article III courts and the ITC.300 Likewise, the foregoing
discussions of shortcomings in AIA trials has situated the PTAB as a substitute for
other tribunals, both in statutory design301 and institutional design.302 Internal
duplication (i.e., relitigating in the PTAB those cases which the PTAB itself has
already decided) has simply not been part of the discussion.
There are good reasons for this. Confined by its nature to the USPTO, internal
duplication is unlikely to frustrate the particular efficiency aims of the AIA. More
basically, it is also less likely to take place. As a matter of operational control, the
USPTO’s workload management incentives make it quite unlikely that the Agency
will tolerate the same cases being litigated repeatedly in the PTAB.
As to the functional mechanisms for avoiding duplication, divergences between
the PTAB and other tribunals do not—indeed, cannot—exist internally. Unlike courtagency estoppel, agency-agency estoppel is bilateral. Standards for claim
construction and the burdens of proof have always been consistent from one PTAB
case to the next. Finally, as a systemic matter, any duplication that does arise
internally does not present concerns about inter-branch comity and the separation of
powers.
Nevertheless, the reason to consider internal duplication now is that the
mechanism that the USPTO has used for managing it is the same mechanism that the
USPTO has quite recently begun to use for grappling with the problem of external
duplication. That mechanism is the Agency’s broad discretion at the pre-institution

300. See supra Section I.B.
301. See supra Section II.A.
302. See supra Section II.B.
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screening phase of AIA trials. The substantial rise of the USPTO’s administrative
and adjudicative power in the past decade is connected closely with its unreviewable
discretion to select its cases.303 By now, the courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the
breadth of this discretion, making it a reliably powerful policy lever for the Agency
to guard against duplicative litigant behavior.
The PTAB’s framework for applying its discretion in this way comes from its
decision in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha.304 Decided in
September 2017, the case was designated precedential the following month.305
General Plastic offers a multifactor analysis for determining whether a petition for
review that might otherwise merit institution should nevertheless be rejected in order
to preserve “the efficiency of the inter partes review process and the fundamental
fairness of the process for all parties.”306 The seven factors that the opinion specifies
reflect all the same concerns as to duplication rather than substitution and as to
harassment rather than beneficial collective action. Those factors are as follow:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition
directed to the same claims of the same patent;
whether at the time of filing of the first petition the
petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second
petition or should have known of it;
whether at the time of filing of the second petition the
petitioner already received the patent owner’s
preliminary response to the first petition or received the
Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first
petition;
the length of time that elapsed between the time the
petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second
petition and the filing of the second petition;
whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for
the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions
directed to the same claims of the same patent;
the finite resources of the Board; and
the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a
final determination not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Director notices institution of review.307

303. See supra Section II.B; Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1676–1704.
304. No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (designated precedential Oct.
18, 2017).
305. Opinions designated “precedential” bind all future PTAB cases unless and until later
binding authority supersedes them. Lesser designations such as “informative” or
“representative” leave an opinion nonbinding but persuasive in various respects. See generally
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
PATENTLY-O (May 10, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/precedent-processpatent.html [https://perma.cc/D2EB-H77T].
306. General Plastic, No. IPR2016-01357, at 18.
307. Id. at 16.
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In making this framework binding upon future PTAB decisions, the USPTO
specifically adopted a policy view that “[a]llowing similar, serial challenges to the
same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and frustration
of Congress’s intent” in the AIA.308 Notably, factor one takes aim at multiple
petitions by the same petitioner, and factors two through five seem to reflect the same
assumption consistent with the facts of General Plastic.
Yet over time, the PTAB has also applied the framework to multiple petitions as
to the same patent but filed by different petitioners. The April 2019 decision in Valve
Corp. v. Electronic Scripting, Products Inc. squarely extended General Plastic in
this way, and Valve Corp. itself was designated precedential a month later.309 Though
controversial in some circles, it seems clear that the use of the General Plastic
framework against nonmutual petitioners is consistent with reducing internally
duplicative litigation310 and is within the unreviewable, institution-related discretion
of the USPTO.311
2. Agency Reaction to Inter-Branch Duplication
What has been more controversial and, indeed, remains a live issue even now, is
the USPTO’s still further expansion of this framework to manage external
duplication.312 The basis for that expansion first came in NHK Spring Co. v. IntriPlex Technologies, Inc.313 and was subsequently elaborated in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv,
Inc.314 These decisions together form the NHK-Fintiv doctrine, a policy of
discretionarily denying institution where a parallel district court proceeding is far
enough along and similar enough in evidence and argument that undertaking review
would be largely or entirely duplicative.
The decision in NHK was a discretionary denial of NHK Spring’s petition against
an Intri-Plex patent.315 The reason for the denial was not duplicative litigation in the
PTAB itself, either by Intri-Plex or by other petitioners, but instead was an
infringement lawsuit involving the same patents and parties that was co-pending in
the Northern District of California.316 The decision to deny institution explained that

308. Id. at 17 n.14.
309. Nos. IPR2019-00062, IPR2019-00063, IPR2019-00084 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2019)
(designated precedential May 7, 2019).
310. See, e.g., Steven C. Carlson, Weaponizing IPRs, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 36,
39–40 (framing Valve Corp. as a “tightening” of the General Plastic standard and situating
the use of the PTAB discretion through these cases as a response to the “harm posed by
duplicative IPR petitions”).
311. See Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Iancu, 829 F. App’x 967, 967–68 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(per curiam).
312. Much of the discussion that follows was included in a public commentary on an APA
lawsuit against the USPTO. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Silicon Valley’s APA Challenge to
PTAB Discretion, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 2, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/siliconchallenge-discretion.html [https://perma.cc/TC5S-J7U5].
313. No. IPR2018-00752 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) (designated precedential May 7, 2019).
314. No. IPR2020-00019 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020) (designated precedential May 5, 2020).
315. NHK, No. IPR2018-00752, at 2.
316. See id. (identifying the co-pending case as Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. NHK Int’l Corp.,
No. 3:17-cv-01097-EMC (N.D. Cal.)).
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the facts at hand did not satisfy the traditional General Plastic framework for
managing internal duplication.317 However, the PTAB did accept the argument “that
the advanced state of the district court proceeding is an additional factor that weighs
in favor of denying the Petition under § 314(a).”318 The parallel litigation was nearing
conclusion, and the PTAB explained that instituting review would not be consistent
with the AIA’s substitutionary purpose.319 In short, NHK did not apply General
Plastic as such but did add an eighth factor, expressly looking outward to parallel
proceedings, to inform PTAB discretion.
To this, Fintiv provided a number of factors for inquiring more specifically into
the state of a parallel proceeding for purposes of a denial under NHK.320 As with the
internally focused questions of General Plastic, these additional Fintiv factors also
reflect concerns of duplication rather than substitution, especially with an eye toward
sunk costs of adjudication:
(1) whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one
may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
(2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
statutory deadline for a final written decision;
(3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
parties;
(4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel
proceeding;
(5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
proceeding are the same party; and
(6) other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
discretion, including the merit.321
The USPTO designated NHK as precedential on May 7, 2019 (the same as it did
Valve Corp.) and Fintiv a year later on May 5, 2020.
Even more recently, the USPTO designated two additional decisions in the NHKFintiv framework as precedential in December 2020. These were Sotera Wireless,
Inc. v. Masimo Corp.322 and Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology, LLC.323 Both were
decisions to grant institution. In Sotera, it was because the petitioner stipulated
broadly that if the inter partes review is instituted, the petitioner “will not pursue in
[the District Court] the specific grounds [asserted in the inter partes review], or on
any other ground . . . that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
2020).
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Id. at 19 (distinguishing the case from General Plastic).
Id. at 20.
Id.
Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019 at 5 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020).
Id. at 6.
No. IPR2020-01019 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020) (designated precedential Dec. 17, 2020).
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. . . .”324 In Snap, it was because the district court proceeding was stayed pursuant to
a jointly stipulated motion by the parties.325
These further precedential and binding refinements to the PTAB’s NHK-Fintiv
policy suggest that the Agency is committed to using its discretion broadly, as it is
continuing to invest in decisions that clarify how that discretion will be used in the
future. The NHK and Fintiv cases themselves offer clear doctrinal signposts for
discretionary denials, and now the Sotera and Snap cases offer comparable signposts
in the other direction for discretionary grants.
Nevertheless, while the influence and importance of PTAB discretion requires an
assessment of reform to begin in the USPTO, the discussion must not end there. Even
with the General Plastic and NHK-Fintiv frameworks in place, much of what
remains to be clarified or corrected with duplicative litigation in the PTAB is
embedded in politically inflected decision-making that can only be restored by
statute to a regime of adequate judicial supervision. And of course, much that remains
to be corrected is simply codified into statute in the first place and so can be reformed
only by legislation. A plan for reform that adequately addresses all of the foregoing
problems and assessments of their causes will require a coherent theoretical
foundation.
III. TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT SUBSTITUTION
This Section offers that theoretical foundation and from it derives a series of
proposed legislative corrections. The discussion to this point has reflected a
preference for maximizing the use of PTAB review in its intended manner as a
substitute, for minimizing the duplication of effort over the same patents as between
the PTAB and other tribunals, and for disfavoring the strategic use of divergent legal
standards to reach certain outcomes. One may reasonably ask, however, what makes
these goals particularly desirable. To make that assessment, it is helpful first to
consider the roles that timing and institutional competence play in resolving legal
questions.
A. Timing and Institutional Competence
As to timing, while there are reasonable arguments for giving priority to a later
adjudicator, those favoring the first adjudicator are ultimately more persuasive.
Meanwhile, there are sound arguments for favoring either the Article III courts or
other institutions such as Article I or Article II tribunals. However, though an expert
institution like the PTAB may be well suited to carry out post-issuance patent validity
review, some current features of PTAB review lack support in the justification from
expertise and merit reform.

324. Sotera, No. IPR2020-01019, at 13–14.
325. Snap, No. IPR2020-00820, at 10.
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1. Priority to the First Adjudicator
In general, the more familiar stance in U.S. law is that priority should go to the
first institution that decides a case. In its stronger form, this preference is embodied
in res judicata doctrines like claim preclusion326 and issue preclusion,327 which if they
do apply to a given matter, conclusively foreclose the matter from further dispute. In
a somewhat weaker form, this preference can be reflected in the jurisprudential norm
of stare decisis, which fosters stability and continuity,328 just as res judicata does but
which also yields adaptively to fairness concerns that precedent, unlike preclusion,
can affect a great many people who were not before the court that issued it.329 As
applied to the patent system in particular, the virtue of finality that underlies these
preferences for first deciders implicates four major values.
The first is repose, widely understood not only as a basic value of adversarial civil
dispute resolution but also among the most important.330 The pathologies of cost,
delay, inaccessibility, and strategic behavior in patent litigation—all of which were
important spurs to the AIA itself331—map quite well onto that “expensive and
harrowing ordeal of litigation” from which litigants should be entitled to “a final
result that not only precludes a second ordeal but also achieves the independent
values of repose.”332
In fact, the salience of repose to patent litigation is so peculiarly strong that, since
well before the U.S. economy reached the pre-AIA tipping point during the mid to
late 2000s, courts have found ways to take specific account of prior decisions
regarding patent validity.333 For example, in 1975, just two years after BlonderTongue gave nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel effect to findings of patent
invalidity, the Northern District of Illinois held that a prior decision upholding a
patent’s validity—though not entitled to collateral estoppel—could be admitted as
evidence against a nonparty without violating due process.334 The opinion in
Columbia Broadcasting v. Zenith Radio explained that admitting the prior judgment
into evidence afforded the opposing party enough opportunity to rebut the conclusion
of the prior judgment (e.g., by impeaching or by offering its own contrary
evidence).335 Other cases from the same period have drawn the connection in terms

326. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18–20 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
327. See generally id. §§ 27–29.
328. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 750–51 (1988).
329. James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B. A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments,
55 YALE L.J. 623, 626 (1946).
330. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 at 22 (3d ed. 2016).
331. See supra Section I.A.
332. 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 330, at 22.
333. Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 999–1001
(1986).
334. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780, 786 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
335. Id. at 786.
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that are even more starkly grounded in promoting repose for patent litigants.336 In all,
these cases reflect a strong preference that the decision of the first adjudicator should
receive priority.
The second major value at stake is reliance. Like repose, reliance is frequently at
the core of arguments in favor of strong principles of finality in adjudication337 and
adherence to stare decisis in jurisprudence.338 The parties to a litigation should, the
argument goes, be able to rely conclusively on a final judgment, and a judgment that
appropriately binds them is, by definition, preclusive.339 Meanwhile, if third parties
can also rely on the judgment because it will also bind their conduct in some
meaningful way and will oblige them to order their affairs accordingly, then such a
judgment can “earn the label of precedent” and receive stare decisis effect.340 In both
contexts, what drives the ability of people—parties and nonparties alike—to rely on
the judgment is the expectation that it will be final in some conclusive sense.
The particular role of reliance interests in the patent system is considerable,
perhaps even more in some ways than that of repose. As a system made primarily of
incentives to innovate and to commercialize innovation, patent rights are foremost a
means for appropriating value from investments in those activities.341 Such
investments are often made on long time horizons that reflect greater uncertainty and
thus respond more favorably to reliable appropriability mechanisms such as
patents.342 The relatively fixed twenty-year term of U.S. patents,343 measured from
the date when the application was filed, offers some hedge against that uncertainty.344
Still, the imperfect evaluation that goes into patent examination means that even
an issued patent will have some uncertainty of being found invalid or noninfringed
later.345 The legal resolution of that uncertainty is valuable, sometimes with as much

336. E.g., Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1974). Notably, the court in Pachmayr found the relevant rationales of repose equally
applicable between patent and trademark law. Id. at 805–06, 806 n.1.
337. See generally Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO STATE L.J. 289
(1993).
338. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013).
339. Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due
Process, 2010 BYU L. REV. 597, 617 (2010).
340. Id.
341. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), https://www.nber.org/papers/w7552
[https://perma.cc/37ZA-UHR4].
342. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 69 (2015);
Ashish Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli & Wesley M. Cohen, R&D and the Patent Premium (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), https://www.nber.org/papers/w9431
[https://perma.cc/72B9-A3JX].
343. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
344. However, the high variation among product life cycles and across industries also
means that the twenty-year patent may overprotect in fast-moving contexts like high
technology, and underprotect in slower-moving and more highly regulated contexts like
pharmaceutical drugs. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 92, 109 (2011).
345. Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 39, at 126–27.
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value in publicly traded markets as the initial patent grant itself.346 However, this
value is derived entirely from—and only to the extent that—the legal decision can
be relied upon and not undone at another date even further in the future. In this way,
the promotion of reliance interests also reflects a strong preference for the decisions
of the first adjudicator.
The third major value is the mitigation of intervening changes in the law, and this
may be regarded as a more generalized variation of reliance. The individual legal
decisions on which litigants and third parties rely are, of course, rarely mechanical
applications of determinate law to clear facts. Instead, they often reflect revisions
and updates to the law. But any drift in the content of law that may occur through
this incremental and interstitial process is different from the structural shock that
comes from major legislative reforms like the AIA.347 In the context of finality, it is
the major structural shock that poses the greater problem, and a particularly apt way
to manage its ill effects is to give greater priority to the first adjudicator (whose
decision preceded the intervening legal change) than to the second adjudicator (who
decided after).
The fourth and final major value at stake is accuracy, especially by avoiding the
risk of hindsight bias. Unlike the relatively universal jurisprudential values of repose
and reliance and the particularly patent-salient problem of intervening legal changes,
hindsight bias is quite specific to the patent system. It is most familiar in the analysis
of whether an invention is, in fact, truly inventive—a requirement that is mediated
primarily through the doctrine of nonobviousness.348 That is to say, to be a
meaningful advance beyond the existing state of the art (and therefore be deserving
of patent protection), an invention must not merely be new in the technical sense of
being different from what has gone before.349 The invention must be sufficiently
different—nontrivially different.350
When undertaking this analysis, it is important not to be derailed by hindsight
bias, the tendency to make factual findings about what happened at some time in the
past by relying inappropriately (though perhaps unavoidably) on information that
was not available at the time. Hindsight bias generally disfavors patent owners, as
even inventions that actually were difficult to conceive may later seem simple or
even trivial in retrospect, all the more if the success of the invention has made it
familiar and commonplace.351 During patent examination, too, the risk of hindsight
bias can attach simply from “having the application in hand, which could serve as a
roadmap through the prior art to make the inventor’s contribution potentially seem
less impressive.”352

346. Id. at 129.
347. Indeed, the same is also true of major judicial decisions such as those the Supreme
Court has issued during its current period of renewed interest in patent law, especially in the
area of patent-eligible subject matter. See Duffy, supra note 114, at 638–47.
348. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
349. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
350. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
351. COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RTS. IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 87–88 (Steven A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004).
352. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1472
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Similarly, the risk of hindsight bias can also infect underlying assumptions about
the technological field or discipline itself. Because inventions in patent law are
defined by reference to the existing state of the art, both ex ante and ex post
evaluation of an invention must limit itself only to what knowledge those in the field
would consider relevant,353 and potentially to any analogous fields where they may
reasonably be expected to look when searching for a solution to a technical
problem.354 However, technical fields are not static but rather they grow and evolve,
just as scientific research itself progresses.355 This propensity for change over time
creates its own risk of hindsight bias. Indeed, given how foundational technological
classification is to the process of evaluating patent validity, this sort of hindsight bias
can quickly reach the point that it can make an outcome-determinative difference in
a range of questions from the patentability of an invention, to the scope of the patent
right, to whether a different good or service infringes the patent, and so on.356
In both forms of hindsight bias, the ultimate implication for decisional design is
the same. The closer that one can be to the point in time being evaluated, the less risk
that hindsight bias will pose and the more accurate the decision will be. This, too,
counsels in favor of giving priority to the first adjudicator, who is always closest in
time to the relevant point of reference.
2. Priority to a Later Adjudicator
Although the reasons for preferring the first adjudicator are compelling, they are
not conclusive. Both in litigation generally and the patent system specifically, there
are reasons why a second or subsequent adjudicator may sometimes be better situated
to produce sound decisions.
The more general set of reasons is connected to selection effects in litigation
itself.357 These effects shape the incentives of parties and the outcomes of cases in
ways that may accurately reflect the private value of resolving a given dispute over
a given patent but not necessarily the social value of the resulting decision. The
starting point for this intuition is that disputes enter the costly, protracted, and often
inefficient fray of federal court only when two main conditions exist. First, there is
sufficient uncertainty about the outcome of the case such that both parties are
relatively optimistic about their respective chances for success.358 Second, the parties
possess relatively good information about the respective costs of various outcomes
and the direct transaction costs from litigation itself.359 Where these criteria are met,

(2016).
353. Vishnubhakat, supra note 3, at 904.
354. Brenda M. Simon, Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness, 65 CASE W.
RESERVE L. REV. 25, 28 (2014); Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REV.
1091, 1094–95 (2011).
355. Vishnubhakat, supra note 3, at 905–06.
356. Id. at 910, 939–40.
357. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
358. Id.
359. Id.
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both parties will tend to litigate so long as their risk-adjusted costs from losing or
settling are lower than their risk-adjusted benefits from prevailing.
In patent litigation, this translates primarily into uncertainty over the validity or
scope of the patent itself,360 with an overall cost-benefit calculation driven by the
value of the patented technology relative to any available non-infringing market
alternatives.361 The net effect is that two main forms of selection take place. Litigants
enter the process nonrandomly either as plaintiffs (usually patent owners) or as
defendants (usually accused infringers), and disputes persist to final judgment
nonrandomly with most exiting through settlement along the way.
The impact of these selections can be profound where patents that are socially
worthless or even harmful, at least from the perspective of some, continue to persist
and proliferate because the parties who have the incentive to challenge them may not
have the ability to do so, and vice versa.362 One particularly high-profile example
from recent years is that of the Myriad Genetics patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes, which formed the basis for Myriad’s genetic diagnostic test for hereditary
breast and ovarian cancer.363 The Patent Office had granted such patents on isolated
gene sequences for many years, and companies in the industry had sued and defended
a great many infringement litigations on those patents. However, because they all
worked in the same space, such companies had no incentive to make the broad
categorical argument that these inventions were ineligible for patent protection.364
That argument did not come before the courts until 2009, when a group of physicians
and patients represented by the ACLU sought a declaratory judgment to that effect
against Myriad’s patents, continuing without settlement until the Supreme Court
finally concluded the case in 2013.365
What these selection effects reveal is that a patent that has survived prior
challenges may have survived because it is, in fact, a strong and meritorious patent—
or it may have survived because of the nature of the arguments that were leveled
against it and the incentives of the parties advancing those arguments. These may not
be representative of all potential arguments and all potential challengers, and so there
may be value in prioritizing the subsequent adjudicator over the earlier one. This
allows subsequent adjudicators to benefit from contemporary conditions that may
have been unavailable before due to earlier selection effects, but it does require
leaving open a continuous opportunity to litigate and relitigate the same matter.
Another, more patent-specific reason to prioritize later adjudicators is that earlier
decisions do not always arise from full information. This is certainly true of patent
examination itself, which is theoretically an evaluation of inventions with respect to
all relevant statutory requirements for patentability and all relevant evidence about
the pre-existing state of the art. However, as the literature on examination’s
shortcomings as well as the rational ignorance thesis concludes, resource constraints

360. See generally Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 39; Ford, supra note 39.
361. See generally Allison, Lemley, Moore, & Trunkey, supra note 38.
362. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 237–38 (2015).
363. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 582–84
(2013).
364. Dreyfuss, supra note 362, at 237.
365. Id. at 292–93.
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and the potential for distortion in the incentives of the Patent Office mean that patents
are not likely to emerge from a fully informed evaluation.366 Recent empirical
research on the evidence asserted against patents in litigation bears out this
conclusion. In particular, district courts that find patents invalid rely to a significant
extent on prior art evidence that was not only absent from the patent examiner’s
initial evaluation of the invention but would have been difficult or even impossible
to find through the examiner search process.367
Similar issues arise when comparing the first adjudicator to a later adjudicator of
patents that have already been issued. Where relevant information about prior art, the
technological history of the problem that the patented invention purported to solve,
and the commercial success of the invention, may not be available to litigants in an
initial dispute but may become available in a subsequent dispute, it would be more
appropriate to give priority to the second adjudicator than to the first. However,
though empirical research shows an information gap between ex ante patent
examination and ex post patent validity review, there does not appear to be
comparable support for an information gap between initial and subsequent ex post
patent validity reviews. Thus, the case for prioritizing the first adjudicator’s decision
about a patent’s validity is, on balance, stronger.
3. Priority to the Courts
As with the familiar preference for first adjudicators, the decisions of courts tend
to enjoy primacy in U.S. law in general. In part, this is a longstanding touchstone of
American legal culture itself, expressed as being “emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is” and the like.368 The argument from
historical practice, however, has now also been under sustained criticism for quite
some time—indeed, in terms that reflect the legislative motivations for the AIA
itself: the judicial process is costly and lengthy, frequently inaccessible, and often
inexpert where the subject matter of litigation is particularly complex or technical.369
It is certainly true that the more common approach in contemporary institutional
design is to allocate decision-making authority to other institutions, such as
administrative agencies or legislative tribunals, while retaining eventual appellate
review in the Article III courts as a backstop.370 Yet this is an answer to a different
question of which institution should adjudicate an issue in the first instance due to its
greater relevant competence. The question at hand is which institution we should
listen to when multiple competing institutions all speak on the same issue.
In practical terms and for present purposes, there are two main arguments that
favor choosing judicial decisions about patent validity over the decisions of other

366. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
367. Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837,
837 (2020).
368. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
369. See generally Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J.L. & POL. 1 (2014)
(distinguishing between domains in which courts, especially the Supreme Court, might
reasonably be thought to exercise expertise—such as constitutional interpretation—from
expertise in the technical sense).
370. Walker & Wasserman, supra note 108, at 170–71; 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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tribunals. One is the avoidance of distortion in individual case decisions through bias
or capture in tribunals that sit within the political branches and are directly
answerable to politically responsive forces. Another, related to the first, is the
preservation of stability in the law and the continued ability of the patent system to
offer credible commitments to would-be innovators and commercializers. The first
is likely not a significant problem in the current system of ex post patent validity
review, but the second does present important concerns.
The application of regulatory capture theory to patent law is a relatively recent
trend in the literature, but a few salient conclusions have already emerged. One is
that the Patent Office itself is at risk of capture, if not already captured, by industry
forces, political actors, or both.371 The origins of this risk include the agency’s
technical and epistemic barriers to entry by non-technologists372 and its resulting
legal insularity from a range of other trans-substantive issues such as jurisdiction,373
jury review,374 judicial deference,375 and pleading procedure.376 Another is that the
agency’s risk for capture is not especially greater than that of other agencies and that
meaningful safeguards are both feasible and available.377 Still another is that courts
themselves are as susceptible, or even more susceptible, to capture than the Patent
Office,378 and the Federal Circuit is a case in point.379
These conclusions are primarily from the context of ex ante patent examination,
though some post-AIA analysis has extended the capture concern to administrative
ex post review as well.380 Still, there does not yet appear to be significant analytical
or empirical reason to think that the PTAB is captured in the sense of resolving

371. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 237–
44 (2015); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 106–07 (2009); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90
B.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2010).
372. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010).
373. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791 (2013).
374. See John F. Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 281, 281–82 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA.
L. REV. 1673, 1673 (2013).
375. See generally Benjamin & Rai, supra note 29; Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?,
65 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2013); Kali Murray, First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent
Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (2008); Wasserman, supra note 111;
Vishnubhakat, supra note 3 at 942–44.
376. See generally Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 63 (2015).
377. See generally Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
487 (2012); Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237 (2012).
378. J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543 (2018).
379. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335–36 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1110–11
(2003); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1601
(2011).
380. See generally Sherkow, supra note 371.
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individual cases in systematic accordance with the preferences of a well-defined
regulated industry or set of industries. The same is true of the ITC and other Article
I tribunals.
The problems of stability and credible commitments are different. Even though
the political-branch tribunals that adjudicate the validity of already-issued patents
may not be captured, their modes of decision-making may nevertheless present
concerns not merely that the substantive content of patent law is changing in one
direction or another but that its rate of change is itself becoming unmanageably
volatile.381 Achieving legal stability in the patent system is already fraught with
difficulties. These difficulties include the familiar tension in patent law between
predictable rules and flexible standards,382 the lack of durable principles—whether
they take the form of rules or standards—in modern patent jurisprudence,383 the
numerous problems of patent notice,384 and even simply of multifocal decisionmaking that requires users of the patent system to satisfy more than one legal
authority before reaching certainty.385
The structures of both the PTAB and the ITC compound these problems. Apart
from technical expertise, which is written into the AIA as a requirement that PTAB
judges “shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability,”386 the
political valence of PTAB decision-making has also recently come into greater focus.
In a series of cases during the mid-2010s, the Patent Office leadership disapproved
of PTAB panel decisions and reconfigured the panels with additional administrative
patent judges to rehear the case and reach different outcomes that were more in line
with the leadership’s preferences.387 The agency subsequently defended this “panel
stacking” practice in multiple cases before the Federal Circuit, explaining that it was
a mechanism for implementing the agency’s legal policy more uniformly,388 that the
agency considered it permissible under Federal Circuit precedent,389 and that the way
in which panels were actually stacked in practice did not injure the decisional
independence of the PTAB.390 High-profile instances of panel stacking as well as
skepticism from the Federal Circuit in oral arguments and published opinions,
however, undermined the agency’s position.391
The ITC, too, is a tribunal with considerable expertise and experience in resolving
patent disputes. But this expertise notwithstanding, the ITC remains susceptible to
political reversals of its decisions because it is subject to oversight by the President,
whose authority in this regard is currently delegated to the United States Trade

381.
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Representative (USTR).392 USTR reversals of the ITC are rare,393 but they are not
unprecedented, and they reflect calculations that are explicitly political.394
These institutional incentives to inject political priorities into questions of patent
validity, which are otherwise defined primarily by technological fact and legal
doctrine, do much to injure the ability of the patent system to offer a credible
commitment that innovators and commercializers will reliably be able to recover
their investments in the future.395 The theory of credible commitments, derived from
new institutional economics, holds that when an institution makes promises in order
to induce others to behave and invest in certain ways, those promises are valuable,
and thus credible, only to the extent that the institution cannot later change its
decision in arbitrary or self-serving ways.396
There is certainly strong and specific reason to expect that recent politically
inflected practices of the Patent Office, such as PTAB panel stacking, are likely to
injure the agency’s ability to make credible commitments.397 The case that ITC
decision-making similarly puts that body at the risk of weakened credibility is less
specific but generally follows the same logic as that of the PTAB. To the extent that
the ITC’s decisions are bound by stable legal precedent and the ITC itself is
answerable to judicial bodies like the Federal Circuit, its decisional ability is
constrained from changing in arbitrary or self-serving ways. But to the extent that its
decisions are beholden to a more regularly changing cast of political actors such as
the USTR or the President, the credibility of the ITC’s commitments may also fairly
be called into question.
The sum of these institutional considerations is that actual regulatory capture of
the PTAB or the ITC is not likely to present significant problems, but the disruptive
influence of political decision-making in both settings, especially the PTAB, does
raise serious concerns about legal stability in patent rights. That disruptive influence
also raises concerns about the ability of patent institutions to make credible
commitments and induce private actors to make choices about resource allocation in
accordance with policy makers’ preferences for social welfare. Those concerns
counsel in favor of giving priority to judicial decisions instead, which are relatively
more insulated from political influence and thus relatively more credible in their
commitments.

392. Assignment of Certain Functions under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed.
Reg. 43,251 (July 26, 2005).
393. Michael Buckler & Beau Jackson, Section 337 as a Force for “Good”? Exploring the
Breadth of Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair Acts Under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 513, 550 (2014).
394. Sherkow, supra note 371, at 243–44; see Landon J. Greene, Alternate Reality:
Limiting the Scope of Presidential Authority under § 337, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 111, 125 (2014).
395. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1728–29.
396. Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV.
31, 64–65 (2016).
397. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1729–33.
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4. Priority to Other Institutions
An important additional point regarding the comparison of Article III courts to
non-Article III tribunals is that, prior to the AIA and historically, judicial process
was the baseline of ex post patent validity review. Thus, the widely subscribed
premise of the AIA in favor of transferring even more adjudicatory power out of the
courts and into more expert and more accessible tribunals merits even greater credit
in light of the entrenched status quo that had to be overcome. To put the point another
way, even if the proponents and drafters of the AIA valued expertise and access
highly and allocated power accordingly, it could not have been enough that the Patent
Office was an expert agency, for that had always been the case. Rather, the promise
and expected payoff of Patent Office expertise had to be so substantial as to produce
a broad bipartisan and bicameral consensus.
That expertise is well documented. In the case of the Patent Office prior to the
AIA’s enactment, the agency’s expertise had generally been manifested in three
activities: classifying technologies to enable patent examination, denying patents,
and granting patents. Classification reflects the least controversial—though, for a
long time, also the most easily overlooked—of these. All major requirements for
patentability as well as several doctrines pertaining to infringement liability and
remedies rely on antecedent definitions of the relevant field of technology in which
the invention sits.398 The Patent Office, for its part, has extensive and longstanding
expertise in developing, maintaining, and periodically updating a comprehensive
taxonomy of technological fields and of classifying individual inventions within that
taxonomy.399 The source of this expertise, that Congress expressly delegated the
authority to the Patent Office in 1898, is also its strongest justification.400
The agency also exercises its expertise in actually examining patents, naturally,
and the greater portion of its expertise is likely to be reflected in denying patents,
more than it is in granting patents, because the statutory presumption of examination
is that the patent should issue.401 Because the agency bears the burden of disproving
patentability, its denials are more likely to reflect the substance of the agency’s
technical expertise than are its grants,402 which may at times reflect little more than
the agency’s resource-constrained inability to push back adequately against a
persistent applicant.403 Moreover, on the question of which institution’s expertise is
best exercised at which stage of decision-making, cases in which the complexity to

398. Vishnubhakat, supra note 3, at 920–934.
399. Id. at 938.
400. Id. at 939 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1946)).
401. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing that the applicant “shall be entitled to a patent unless”
the applicant fails to overcome various hurdles set forth in the statute).
402. Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 907, 912 (2004) (arguing that “when the USPTO denies a patent, the fact-finding
associated with the USPTO’s analysis is much more likely to be accurate. This is because the
patent examiner has the burden of demonstrating the unpatentability of the applicant’s
assertions, and thus the examiner is required to assemble evidence supporting the rejection”).
403. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
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be resolved is in the technological facts themselves are usually best left to the expert
fact-finder in the first instance, i.e., the agency.404
Meanwhile, the ITC is also an expert agency of a sort.405 Unlike administrative
patent judges of the PTAB, administrative law judges and commissioners of the ITC
are not required to have scientific training or doctrinal familiarity with patent law.406
Nonetheless, they have tended to preside over a high volume of patent-related
cases.407 In fact, that volume has only risen over time as the ITC’s prominence has
grown in the wake of the eBay v. MercExchange decision.408
These extensive indicia of expertise on the part of non-Article III tribunals prior
to the AIA were good reason to expect that the same expertise would offer substantial
benefits in the ex post patent validity review proceedings that the AIA envisioned. In
fact, the well-rehearsed pathologies of patent litigation arose largely from the lack of
expertise among lay judges and juries. If litigation in the federal courts was expensive
and protracted, it was because attorneys had to invest significant amounts of money
and time in teaching generalist decision makers about the relevant technology and
the relevant law or else risk inaccurate or otherwise distorted outcomes.409
Apart from the familiar and well-supported invocation of expertise, preferring
other institutions than federal courts also offered a means for broadening access to
patent validity challenges410 and for reducing the collective action problem that had
long plagued traditional judicial review.411 The problem of access stems from the
need for Article III standing, which permits the invocation of federal judicial power
only in genuine cases or controversies.412 In this regard, a generalized grievance that
a patent was, in the view of the challenger, wrongly granted is not likely to confer
standing to sue whereas a more specific showing that the wrongly granted patent
poses actual or imminent injury to the challenger probably is.413
Where the line of demarcation lies for showing an injury-in-fact sufficient for
Article III standing is, of course, contested and difficult to predict as with any other
flexible standard of a constitutional dimension. Where there is at least some
agreement, however, is that the Federal Circuit’s precedents on standing in disputes
involving patent law has been unduly restrictive and that even the Supreme Court’s
2007 intervention in MedImmune v. Genentech did little to dislodge the Federal
Circuit’s hidebound jurisprudence.414 These patent-specific standing rules may fall

404. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989).
405. Kumar, supra note 379, at 1547.
406. Id. at 1590.
407. Id.
408. Chien & Lemley, supra note 73, at 2–3.
409. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1671; Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 51–
55.
410. Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 54–55.
411. Id. at 54.
412. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
413. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130 (2007).
414. See generally Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 498 (2015); John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk,
and Separation of Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2015).
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especially hard on economically disempowered segments of the market, such as
individual consumers.415 They may also shield questionable patents themselves from
socially valuable legal scrutiny, scrutiny that parties more directly engaged with the
patent system often have little incentive to invite.416
By contrast, non-Article III tribunals such as the PTAB and the ITC are not subject
to the case-or-controversy requirement and need not impose any requirement of
standing upon parties seeking relief. In the PTAB, no standing is required at all:
anyone “who is not the owner of a patent” may seek administrative review
challenging the validity of a patent.417 In the ITC, meanwhile, the level of standing
necessary is rather minimal: a patent owner may bring suit only if a domestic industry
that is related to the patented invention “exists or is in the process of being
established.”418
The result is substantially greater access for litigants in these alternative tribunals
as compared to their corresponding access in the federal courts. In fact, this is true
even though subsequent appeals to the Federal Circuit still require Article III
standing, which a litigant at the margin would not have enjoyed in the first instance.
For appeals from the PTAB, the Federal Circuit thus far has rejected arguments that
a petitioner who otherwise lacks all Article III standing can acquire a sufficient
injury-in-fact simply by losing in the administrative proceeding below.419 Instead,
the court has held that the AIA creates only a procedural right to seek review, a right
that is satisfied regardless of whether the challenge is ultimately successful or not,
and that denying a patent validity challenge by a party that has no personal stake in
making, selling, or using the patented invention does not invade any legal right.420
On first impression, it may seem that the Federal Circuit’s case law on appellate
standing dissipates whatever benefit might have accrued from the fully permissive
access that the AIA confers in the PTAB below. But this is not so. Patent owners,
who come before the PTAB in a defensive posture to argue against the revocation of
their patent rights, can satisfy the Consumer Watchdog standard—and, indeed, the
more general injury-in-fact jurisprudence—quite easily by pointing to any adverse
effects on their patent rights.421 It is only unsuccessful patent challengers who may
not be able to appeal, ironically disadvantaging “those very parties who benefit the
most at the margins from having access to administrative review—precisely because
they could not otherwise have established standing to seek declaratory relief in
federal court.”422 Still, when an unsuccessful patent owner appeals an adverse

415. See generally Gaia Bernstein, The End User’s Predicament: User Standing in Patent
Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1929 (2016).
416. Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 87, 89–90
(2017).
417. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a).
418. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).
419. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
420. Id. at 1261–62.
421. Jonathan Stroud & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Appellate Standing, Biosimilars, and the
Federal Circuit, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 11, 2019), www.patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/appellatestanding-biosimilars.html [https://perma.cc/CX6K-B4K2].
422. Id.
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judgment from the PTAB, the successful challenger can safely rely on the appellantpatent owner’s standing to enter the Federal Circuit.423 Thus, of all the non-Article
III litigants who can enter the system through the PTAB, only a subset (those who
lose) are currently excluded from continued access. This is still an improvement over
the status quo ante and is another reason to prioritize non-Article III courts.
The problem of access is closely connected to the problem of collective action in
mounting challenges to patent validity: even those who do possess Article III
standing are frequently at a disincentive to use it. While litigation is expensive, the
investment of an individual challenger in revoking a patent is nearly impossible to
recoup because of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation.424 The estoppel effect of a patent invalidation makes a successful patent
challenge a public good: the challenge is nonrival and nonexcludable from all others,
including those who played no part in supporting the patent validity challenge.425
Such goods are generally undersupplied, reflecting a collective action problem
that makes would-be challengers unwilling to undertake ex post patent validity
review for fear of inviting others to “free ride from the efforts of the former patentee
and the opponent, employing the teachings of the invalidated patent to practice the
invention without compensation to anyone.”426 PTAB review, given its lower cost,
does not remove the collective action problem but likely does reduce its scale.427
This, too, is a further reason to give priority to non-Article III courts.
Yet the comparative institutional arguments advanced here—which weigh the
deeper expertise and broader access of agency tribunals against the greater legal
stability and more credible commitments of federal courts—still prove too little
about the actual design of the AIA. Suppose that Congress was right to prioritize
agency expertise because it leads to cheaper, faster, and more accurate outcomes.
And suppose that Congress was also right to remove any standing requirement
because questionable patents have no valid claim to survival merely by limiting the
pool of people who can challenge them. These departures from the pathologies of
litigation both address the quality of decision-making about patent validity vis-à-vis
who decides and what arguments and evidence are brought forth.
These emphases on decisional quality are legitimate because they are contentneutral as to the patents being evaluated. The aforementioned intractable premise of
the AIA,428 that easing the invalidation of questionable patents requires easing the
invalidation of all patents, can be managed at least to this extent. Though it is
unavoidable that all patents will now be easier to revoke as a practical matter, the
reason why they are easier to revoke is still a valuable policy lever to help
differentiate patent quality reform that is genuinely concerned with weeding out
poor-quality patents while leaving meritorious patents alone. However, if the

423. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office Intervene in Its Own Cases?, 73
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 233–235 (2018).
424. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
425. Miller, supra note 82, at 688–89.
426. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333 (2001).
427. Vishnubhakat, supra note 1, at 1696–1697; Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2,
at 54–55.
428. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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objective is a more indiscriminate attack on patent rights with relative indifference
to leaving meritorious patents intact, then the particular reasons why all patents are
easier to invalidate are far less important.
The current structure of ex post patent validity review in the PTAB suggests the
latter. In addition to deeper expertise from agency adjudicators and broader access
for properly incentivized challengers, the greater risk of invalidation in PTAB review
has also arisen, until recently, from giving patent claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation.429 And the greater risk of invalidation continues to arise even now
from failing to give patents a presumption of validity and failing to require that
invalidity be proven by clear and convincing evidence.430 These are further
deviations from the pre-AIA baseline of federal court litigation with no basis either
in the expertise of the decision-maker or in the proper incentives of would-be
challengers. They are not content-neutral with respect to the patents being challenged
and are equally as likely to adversely affect a meritorious patent as they are to weed
out an unmeritorious one.
B. Legislative Prescriptions
By decoupling and separately considering the design parameters of timing and
institutional competence, the foregoing discussion revealed two important insights.
One is that timing, standing alone, tends to favor the first adjudicator. This might
provoke concern that large swaths of outcomes from PTAB review, especially inter
partes review, have been the result of poor institutional design. But that conclusion
does not follow from timing alone. The discussion of institutional competence, after
all, makes a fairly strong case for favoring courts but recognizes the significant
advantages of agency adjudication as well, readily accommodating the AIA’s actual
preference for the expert agency. The second insight, that even expertise and access
in non-Article III adjudication leave important features of the PTAB lacking in
justification, is what calls the current design of the AIA into serious question—while
also narrowing the scope of concern.
To grapple with that question, this subsection offers specific legislative reform
proposals, informed in part by lessons from trademark law. Patents in PTAB
reevaluation should enjoy the same statutory presumption of validity and the same
requirement for invalidity to be proven by clear and convincing evidence as in the
courts.431 Statutory estoppel between the courts and the PTAB should be bilateral,
rather than binding the courts while leaving the agency free to disregard judicial
decisions. And patent claim construction in the PTAB should be subject, by statute,
to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp.432
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1. Aligning the Administrative Burden of Proof
Similarly, and with greater reason for statutory amendment, the presumption of
validity, as well as the burden and standard of rebutting that presumption by clear
and convincing evidence, should also be the same in the agency as they have long
been in the courts and those presumptions of validity were recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership.433 In enacting the AIA,
Congress dealt specifically with the standard of proof and chose a mere
preponderance of the evidence as the standard.434 This was a mistake of policy by
Congress for the same reason that the initial use of broadest reasonable
interpretations was a mistake of policy by the Patent Office. Although the agency
did, and does, have significant virtues of superior expertise and access relative to the
federal courts, those virtues still do not justify the use of divergent substantive
standards for evaluating patentability. Not only does this disparity allow patents that
would otherwise have survived judicial review to be struck down, but it also tolerates
and even encourages numerous instances in which patents actually did survive prior
judicial review only to fall in the PTAB as the result of legal arbitrage.
It is no reply, moreover, to say that if aligned standards of proof are all that matter,
then the courts, as well as the Patent Office (and, for that matter, the ITC), could all
turn instead to a preponderance standard. Before the enactment of the AIA, this very
question came before the Court in Microsoft v. i4i.435 In that case, i4i had sued
Microsoft for allegedly infringing i4i’s patent on an improved method for computer
document editing, and Microsoft responded by asserting that i4i’s patent was
invalid.436 There was no doubt that the patent examiner during examination had never
considered the prior art that Microsoft now offered as evidence that i4i’s patent was
invalid, but there was vigorous dispute over whether that prior art would actually
have any invalidating effect on the i4i patent.437 Microsoft argued that it should not
be required in court to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence but rather
that a mere preponderance should be enough where the evidence offered was
evidence that had not been before the examiner.438
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the common law background
against which Congress had codified the presumption of validity in the 1952 Patent
Act included an understanding that the presumption was “not to be overthrown
except by clear and cogent evidence.”439 That background understanding, in turn,
reflected “nearly a century of case law from [the Supreme Court] and others”
supporting a near-universal consensus “that a preponderance standard of proof was
too ‘dubious’ a basis to deem a patent invalid.”440 For the same reason, it would be
prudent now to revise the PTAB’s statutory standard of proof in ex post patent
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validity review proceedings to require clear and convincing evidence, just as the
courts require.
2. Making Interbranch Estoppel Bilateral
To put these proposed reforms into perspective, it is helpful to consider the
example of trademark law. Just as patents are subject to ex post review of their
validity in the PTAB, so also are trademark registrations subject to review in the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). The TTAB is also an administrative
alternative to judicial resolution, and once the registration is canceled, the revocation
of the trademark registration is also subject to nonmutual defensive collateral
estoppel—i.e., the registration is thereafter invalid as against the world.
These analytical similarities between the PTAB and TTAB extend to the
paradigm of court-agency substitution as well. Section 14 of the Lanham Act
authorizes the TTAB to hear a cancellation proceeding,441 and Section 37 authorizes
the federal courts to do the same.442 Though a bare claim for judicial cancellation is
disfavored, this is only in the jurisdictional sense that Section 37 does not create an
independent right of action. Instead, such a claim must either be presented in
response to a suit for infringement or must accompany a preemptive suit for
declaratory judgment by the challenger.443 Ultimately, then, this fully mirrors the two
possible postures for judicial invalidation of patents as well.
However, unlike the ex post reevaluation of patent rights, court-agency
substitution in reevaluating the validity of trademark registrations is, in important
respects, considerably simpler. For example, there is no meaningful distinction
between standard and nonstandard petitioners in the TTAB. In the PTAB, inter
partes review is primarily a forum for standard petitioners: about 70% seek review
in defensive response to an infringement lawsuit already filed against them in the
federal courts.444 What the remaining 30%, who are nonstandard petitioners, seek
instead is preemptive review akin to declaratory relief.445 Covered business method
review, meanwhile, is available only as a defensive response to infringement
litigation, making nonstandard petitioning impossible.
There is also no statutory constraint between parallel proceedings in the TTAB
and the federal courts as there is for the PTAB. The one-year time bar for bringing
an inter partes review in the PTAB does not exist for bringing a cancellation under
Section 14 in the TTAB. The discretionary power of courts to grant stays (or not)
pending resolution of a parallel agency proceeding is the same in both contexts.

441. 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
442. 15 U.S.C. § 1119.
443. Ryan Vacca, Abolishing the Missing-Claim Rule for Judicial Cancellations, 18 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 297, 307–08 (2010) (first citing 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:110 (5th ed. 2009); then citing 4A LOUIS
ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 26:53 (4th ed. 2009)).
444. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 73; see supra text accompanying note
61.
445. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 2, at 73; see supra text accompanying note
61.
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Indeed, the only substitutionary influence in trademark cancellation is the preclusive
power of whichever tribunal decides first, the TTAB or the court.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Section 14 proceedings provide a twostage structure for seeking administrative cancellation in the TTAB, akin to what
post-grant review provides prospectively for patents issued under the first-inventorto-file provisions of the AIA. For trademarks that have been registered for fewer than
five years, cancellation is available on the basis of any of the substantive statutory
requirements for registrability under Section 2 of the Lanham Act.446 These include
showing that the mark does not contain matter that
(1) is immoral, deceptive, scandalous, or disparaging; (2) consists of a
national, state, or municipal flag or insignia; (3) consists of the name,
portrait, or signature of certain individuals; (4) is likely to cause
confusion with existing marks; (5) is merely descriptive, misdescriptive,
functional, or primarily merely a surname; or (6) would likely cause
dilution by blurring or tarnishment.447
Cancellation is also available on the further grounds that the trademark “has become
generic, functional, or abandoned; was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the
provisions of sections 2(a), (b), or (c); or is being used to misrepresent the source of
the goods or services.”448 For trademarks that have been registered for more than five
years, only these further grounds are available.
This mirrors the two-stage process for challenging post-AIA patents, which are
subject to broad challenges in PGR for the first nine months after their issuance and
are subject thereafter to narrower challenges in IPR and CBM.449 However, the
myriad additional structural differences among PGR, IPR, and CBM are not present
in Section 14 cancellation proceedings, leaving a much simpler agency substitute in
trademark law.
This pattern of simplicity extends beyond the contours of adjudicatory power
itself to post-adjudication estoppel as well. A final judgment in a cancellation
proceeding in the TTAB under Section 14 precludes relitigation of the same issues
in future TTAB proceedings as well.450 Similarly, as the Supreme Court recently held
in B&B Hardware v. Hargis Industries, preclusion from a final judgment in a TTAB
cancellation proceeding extends to the federal courts as well.451 The facts of B&B
Hardware are analogous to administrative patent validity review not only in terms
of court-agency substitution but in legal substance as well.
B&B had registered the trademark SEALTIGHT for metal fasteners in the
aerospace industry, and Hargis, three years later, tried to register the trademark
SEALTITE for metal screws in metal and post-frame buildings.452 Concerned with
potential consumer confusion, B&B asserted its priority by opposing Hargis’s
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registration for SEALTITE in a pre-issuance proceeding before the TTAB.453 The
TTAB agreed that Hargis’s proposed SEALTITE trademark would have been
confusingly similar to B&B’s SEALTIGHT trademark and ruled in favor of B&B.454
Meanwhile, B&B had also sued Hargis for infringing B&B’s trademark registration
on SEALTIGHT, and the TTAB reached its conclusion while that court case was still
pending.455 B&B then argued to the district court that the TTAB’s conclusion
foreclosed Hargis from disputing that the trademarks were confusingly similar.456
However, the district court rejected B&B’s estoppel argument on the grounds that
the TTAB was not an Article III court and so could not bind the district court by
preclusion.457 The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that when duplicative
litigation arises in multiple tribunals, “the decision of the first tribunal usually must
be followed by the second, at least if the issue is really the same”—and that to do
otherwise “wastes litigants’ resources and adjudicators’ time, and it encourages
parties who lose before one tribunal to shop around for another.”458
But just as importantly, and since long before B&B Hardware, the reverse has
also been true. A final judgment in a judicial cancellation proceeding under Section
37 precludes relitigation of the same issues in future TTAB proceedings.459 This is
all subject to the ordinary requirements of preclusion that the issue was “actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment” and that “the determination
is essential to the judgment.”460 Thus, what is particularly telling about the example
of bilateral court-agency estoppel in trademark law is not B&B Hardware, though
that opinion was certainly a significant surprise to many in both the administrative
law and intellectual property fields.
For illuminating the institutional design of the PTAB, the question that B&B
Hardware answers is merely about how final administrative judgments influence
subsequent judicial proceedings. On that question, the AIA provides an express
statutory answer in § 315(e)(2) for inter partes review and in § 325(e)(2) for postgrant review and covered business method review. Instead, the problematic
duplication in ex post patent validity review has arisen from the Patent Office
ignoring the prior judicial conclusions of the federal courts. And in this regard, the
lesson of trademark law is clear and longstanding: even if the first adjudicator is a
generalist court and the second adjudicator an expert agency, the prior decision
controls.
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3. Codifying Court-Aligned Claim Construction
Detailed analysis of the two key aforementioned design parameters—timing461
and institutional competence462—suggests that if all else is equal, then the analysis
and decision of the first tribunal to adjudicate patent validity should control.
However, if all else is not equal because, say, the first tribunal was merely a
generalist court and the second tribunal was an expert agency with more robust
access for properly incentivized litigants, even then, the relative virtues of the agency
still do not justify the use of divergent substantive standards for evaluating
patentability. The method for construing the patent claims should be the same in the
agency as it previously was in the court, the Phillips v. AWH Corp. standard.
As of late 2018, the Patent Office has expressed agreement with this view and has
put into effect a rule formally ending the PTAB’s approach of giving claims their
broadest reasonable interpretation and instead using the Phillips approach of the
district courts.463 This was a sound and welcome change, one that was met with
strong support among law and economics scholars of the patent system.464 The
twenty-one-professor response especially highlighted that divergence in the
standards of claim construction—and of the standards of proof for establishing
invalidity—was the key hindrance to generating preclusive effect for the first tribunal
that decides on patent validity.465 Removing these divergences, beginning with a
unified court-agency standard for claim construction, offered “an opportunity to
reduce needless duplicative litigation, [and w]hen taken, that opportunity would
eliminate the associated costs for the USPTO, the courts, and the parties alike.”466
The Patent Office did take this opportunity, but what one agency administration
gives, the next might take away. The 2018 rule change itself was just that sort of
reversal, for the agency’s initial choice of the broadest reasonable interpretation had
been quite purposeful. One of the earliest challenges against the rules package that
embodied PTAB practice had targeted the use of broadest reasonable interpretation
in inter partes review proceedings, and the Patent Office had defended its choice—
successfully—all the way to the Supreme Court in Cuozzo v. Lee.467 Therefore, it
would be prudent during the current season of reform to entrench the Phillips
approach into PTAB review by statute in order to ensure its continued vitality.
CONCLUSION
The institutional design problem of seeking efficient case resolutions in patent
law by substituting agency expertise for the generalism, cost, delay, and error of

461. See supra Sections III.A.1–III.A.2.
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464. See generally Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 224; see also Michael Risch, The
Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2007).
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judicial process is a perennially difficult one. The AIA and its administrative trial
proceedings reflect the most ambitious implementation of the substitution thesis in
the history of U.S. patent law. As that system enters into its second decade, it is
necessary and proper to consider what problems still remain and to identify where
they arise.
Likewise, in pressing for reform, it is important that the corrections reflect the
lessons of past judicial victories and defeats as well as the results of prior experiments
in regulatory policy. Most importantly, structural change to the design of courtagency substitution should be resilient and sustainable beyond the political
leadership of the day.
To that discourse, this Article has made three principal contributions.
Descriptively, it offers the most extensive empirical account to date of duplication in
PTAB litigation. Analytically, it offers a systematic explanation of the statutory and
institutional sources of that duplication. Normatively, it concludes with a framework
for rethinking the substitution thesis and with targeted legislative proposals to
modernize the PTAB for the new decade.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Computers & Communications-Related Patents Across
Five High-Volume Patent Districts

Figure 3. Distribution of Electrical & Electronic-Related Patents Across Five
High-Volume Patent Districts
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Figure 4. Distribution of Mechanical-Related Patents Across Five High-Volume
Patent Districts

Figure 5. Distribution of Chemical-Related Patents Across Five High-Volume
Patent Districts
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Figure 6. Distribution of Drugs & Medical-Related Patents Across Five HighVolume Patent Districts

Figure 7. Motions to Amend in Inter Partes Review, Retrospective 12-month
Average

En banc rehearing
granted in Aqua
Products (Aug. 2016)
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Figure 8. Outcomes of Motions to Amend in Inter Partes Review, Retrospective
12-month Average

PTAB guidance issued
after Aqua Products
(Nov. 2017)

Figure 9. The Immediate Impact of SAS Institute on Petitioner Filing Behavior (4month windows immediately before and after April 24, 2018)
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set of petitions
between the same
petitioner and patent
owner)
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Figure 10. Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and First Federal Court
Litigation, in Years
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Figure 11. Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and Last Federal Court
Filing Prior to Petition, in Years
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